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At the Crossroads of Federalism and
Arbitration: The Application of Prima Paint
to Purportedly Void Contracts
BY PIERRE H. BERGERON
A seemingly simple question has yielded considerable litigation
with conflicting results: whether an arbitrator, rather than a
court, must determine if a contract containing an arbitration clause is
void. This question arises against a backdrop of strong judicial support of
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").' While courts have historically
demonstrated a mistrust of the arbitral forum, the United States Supreme
Court has struggled over the past few decades to overcome this hostility.2
One of the primary means for facilitating arbitration is the "severability"
doctrine embraced by the Supreme Court in its seminal Prima Paint
decision.3 The Prima Paint Court recognized that a claim for fraud in the
inducement could not defeat arbitration unless it was specifically
directed at the arbitration clause.4 Thus, the arbitration clause was to be
evaluated separately from the underlying contract.
Associate, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P., Cincinnati, Ohio; Adjunct Pro-
fessor of Appellate Practice at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. The author
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9 U.S.C. §§ 4-13 (2004).
2 The Court requires that lower courts "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). The FAA "leaves no
place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district
courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration
agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218
(1985). The mandatory provisions of the FAA do not permit parties to "ignore the
contract and resort to the courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of
the very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate." Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984). Any doubts concerning arbitration must be
resolved in favor of arbitration, see, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), and the "party resisting arbitration bears the burden of
proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration." Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000).
3 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
4 Id. at 406.
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Left open by Prima Paint, however, is the question of whether the
same analytical framework governs an allegation that the underlying
contract is void. Drawing a distinction between void and voidable
contracts, litigants have argued, and some courts have held, that the reach
of Prima Paint stops at the frontier of void contracts. Such a position, as
explained below, poses threats to the severability doctrine because the
lines of demarcation between void and voidable contracts are not always
clear and because any weakening of the severability doctrine will
encourage a doctrinal shift in attacking arbitration agreements.
Yet, that is precisely what many commentators are advocating:
curtailment or outright repudiation of the severability rule.6 Concerns for
federalism motivate many of these attacks. As the Supreme Court has
forced reluctant states to follow the strictures of the FAA, the states'
ability to regulate contracts containing arbitration clauses has noticeably
waned. The exertion of federal power in the arbitration realm contrasts
sharply with the recent tidal wave of "states' rights" federalism decisions
during Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice, and the juxtaposition of these
two lines of jurisprudence may understandably leave many scratching
their heads.7 Opponents of intrusion of the FAA into the states' realm
have accordingly championed federalism as a means for limiting (or
eliminating) Prima Paint.
8
Considered against this backdrop, the continued vitality of the Prima
Paint severability doctrine, as well as its application to purportedly void
contracts, assumes great significance. The answer to the void contract
question will carry wide-reaching implications for arbitration doctrine,
as well as in the broader context of the federalism debate. Given the
stakes, it may not be surprising that this area of the law is punctuated by
case law that appears to be in tension, which gives proponents of
restricting Prima Paint new ammunition. Perhaps more importantly, a
sharp federal/state divide has emerged on the void contract question.
While three federal circuits have recently applied the severability
doctrine to allegedly void contracts, 9 state courts have shown little
5 See infra Section I.C.
6 See infra note 41.
See, e.g., Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration
Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Procedure, 77 NEB.
L. REv. 397, 400 (1998) ("The Court's continued willingness to find that the FAA
preempts state arbitration law is strikingly contrary to the deference the Court has
otherwise shown to state sovereignty in other areas of the law.").
8 See infra Section I.B.
9 Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002); Bess v.
Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (1lth Cir. 2002); Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky.,
L.L.C., 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001).
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hesitation in charting an alternative course.10 Adding to the confusion is
existing commentary on this subject, which misapprehends a line of
cases on signatory power and seeks to portray them as in conflict with
recent federal appellate decisions." However, this "conflict" is largely
illusory because these federal cases can be interpreted harmoniously.
This article seeks to reconcile the federal authority and argues that
the courts and commentators are asking the wrong question. Rather than
focusing on the void/voidable distinction, courts should evaluate the
arbitrability question by asking if the challenge to arbitration implicates
the underlying agreement and, if so, whether the party resisting
arbitration can raise a credible issue of signatory assent. Only if this
latter showing can be made should the court decline (at least temporarily)
to direct the matter to arbitration. Under this rule, certain-although not
all-void contracts would be arbitrated. This position, of course,
presupposes that Prima Paint should retain its vitality.
Part I examines the Prima Paint decision and highlights Justice
Black's dissent, which provides the framework for arguments in favor of
an exception for void contracts. This part also introduces the rising
chorus of commentary that argues for the repeal or modification of
Prima Paint. Part II turns to the so-called "signatory power" line of
cases that have spawned so much confusion, and it introduces the
question of assent. With that foundation in mind, Part III considers how
federal and state courts have applied Prima Paint in the context of
contracts alleged to be void ab initio. This Part highlights the doctrinal
flaws in the states' approach to this question and discusses the impact of
federalism on their analysis. Finally, Part IV argues for retention of the
severability doctrine and explores the consequences of applying the
Prima Paint rule to void contracts. Throughout the article, the role of
federalism will be considered in relation to Prima Paint and its
application to void contracts. In particular, Part IV outlines a role for
state law that is consistent with the Prima Paint regime.
J See, e.g., Onvoy, Inc. v. Shal, L.L.C., 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003); Nature's 10
Jewelers v. Gunderson, 648 N.W.2d 804 (S.D. 2002).
11 See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, "Nothing Comes of Nothing".... Or Does It??? A
Critical Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Separability in American Arbitration, 12 AM.
REv. INT'L ARB. 223 (2001); Andre V. Egle, Note, Back to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co.: To Challenge an Arbitration Agreement You Must
Challenge the Arbitration Agreement, 78 WASH. L. REv. 199 (2003); Joshua R. Welsh,
Note, Has Expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act Gone Too Far?: Enforcing
Arbitration Clauses in Void Ab Initio Contracts, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 581 (2002).
2004-2005]
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I. PRIMA PAINT AND THE SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE
A. The Severability Doctrine
Any discussion of the arbitrability of allegedly void contracts under
the FAA must begin with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co. 12 In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court recognized and
embraced the severability rule that treats arbitration clauses as separate
from the underlying agreements in which they are contained. 3 Prima
Paint involved a situation in which one party sought to avoid arbitration
by claiming that the underlying contract was procured by fraud.
Although some courts had followed this rule and recognized that a court,
rather than an arbitrator, should determine whether fraud infected the
contract, the Supreme Court squarely rejected that approach:
We hold, therefore, that in passing upon a [section] 3 application for a
stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate. In
so concluding, we not only honor the plain meaning of the statute but
also the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration
procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not
subject to delay and obstruction in the courts. 14
As a result, only if the party resisting arbitration could demonstrate that
the fraud went to the making of the agreement to arbitrate could the court
"proceed to adjudicate it.' 5
In reaching this result, the Court grounded its decision upon section
4 of the FAA. 16 Focusing on the language regarding the "making of the
agreement for arbitration," the court determined that any issue which
goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate-such as a claim of
fraudulent inducement of the arbitration provision-would require
12 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
13 See id. at 403-04.
14Id. at 404. The First Circuit was the most visible proponent of the minority
approach, which recognized that the "severability" question was one of state law. See,
e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 923-24 (1st Cir. 1960).
15 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
16 Section 4 provides, in pertinent part:
"The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not an issue,
the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement... if the making of the arbitration
agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be an issue, the
court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
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judicial resolution. 17 Conversely, the Court declined to read the FAA as
permitting courts "to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the
contract generally." 18 This specific/general dichotomy has led some
courts writing in the aftermath of Prima Paint to adopt a fairly simple
analytical structure: if the challenge is targeted at the arbitration clause, it
secures judicial resolution, whereas if it more broadly calls into question
the underlying contract, then the matter is referred to arbitration.' 9
However convenient this mode of analysis might be, and despite its
appropriateness for most garden-variety challenges to the enforceability
of arbitration provisions, Prima Paint does not speak directly to
situations in which a contract is claimed to be void. Justice Black's
dissent, however, foreshadowed this very issue. Ever the textualist,
Justice Black began his dissent with an analysis of the language of the
FAA. Section 4, with its "making of the agreement for arbitration"
provision, does not provide an "explicit answer" in Justice Black's eyes
to the severability point. Instead, it "merely poses the further question of
what kind of allegations put the making of the arbitration agreement in
issue.' Shifting attention to sections 2 and 3, Justice Black concluded
that they simply require that arbitration agreements be enforced "unless
the court, not the arbitrator, finds grounds 'at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.' 22 Justice Black believed that fraud un-
doubtedly fell in this category.23
Unable to discern any direct support for the severability rule in the
text of the FAA, Justice Black dusted off the legislative history and
provided several examples of legislators who presumed that an attack on
a contract containing an arbitration provision based on fraud would be
decided by a court. 24 Justice Black also relied on a common sense
'7 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
1 'Id. at 404.
19 Professor Rau correctly criticizes this oversimplification of Prima Paint. See Alan
Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 333-34 (1999)
(calling this a "bizarre and inexplicable misreading"). As explained more fully below,
this approach fails to appreciate the importance of assent. See infra notes 57-94 and
accompanying text.
20 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 412 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Let us look briefly at the
language of the Arbitration Act itself as Congress passed it.").
21 Id. at 410 (Black, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 412 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting section 2 of the FAA).
23 Id. at 413 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Fraud, of course, is one of the most common
grounds for revoking a contract.").
24 Id. at 413-14 (Black, J., dissenting). While Justice Black's survey of the
legislative history does not establish that a claim for fraud automatically secures a
judicial audience, it does indicate that Congress may not have contemplated the
severability rule as adopted by the Court. Presumably because the majority believed the
2004-2005]
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approach to the question: when fraud induces a party to enter into a
contract, it induces that party to enter the entire contract, including any
arbitration provision. He could not accept the notion that the contract
could be broken down into discrete subparts-some of which were
immune (at least in judicial eyes) from the fraud.25
Although Justice Black could not secure a majority for his position in
Prima Paint, advocates of excluding void contracts from arbitration
essentially echo his reasoning.26 Justice Black recognized that "a court
might, after a fair trial, hold the entire contract-including the arbitration
agreement-void because of fraud in the inducement .... If the contract
was procured by fraud, then, unless the defrauded party elects to affirm it,
there is absolutely no contract, nothing to be arbitrated.,27 The fact that
the fraud could invalidate the entire contract, including the arbitration
agreement, however, gave the Supreme Court majority no pause in
ratifying the severability doctrine. Nevertheless, critics of arbitrability of
void contracts generally argue that an arbitration clause contained in a
contract deemed to be void ab initio can have no legal effect because the
underlying contract does not exist. This point will be discussed in greater
detail below in Part III.
B. Determining That the FAA is Based on the Commerce Power
Prima Paint's importance is not confined to the severability doctrine;
another facet of the opinion also contributed greatly to the expansion of
the FAA's scope. 28 Before Prima Paint, the Supreme Court had avoided
determining under which power Congress had acted in promulgating the
FAA. Prima Paint, however, was a diversity case, which forced the
Court to decide whether the FAA was substantive or procedural under
the Erie regime.29
language of the FAA was clear on this point, it offered no response to the legislative
history argument. See also Harding, supra note 7, at 450 ("The commentary has
overwhelmingly and sharply criticized the Court's treatment of legislative history [in
Prima Paint].").
25 See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407.
26 See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 110 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000)
("The dissenting opinion in Prima Paint does imply that the majority in that case rejected
the void/voidable distinction."); Welsh, supra note 11, at 606 ("Justice Black, in his
Prima Paint dissent, seemingly spoke to a situation not all that dissimilar from the
situation in Burden.").
27 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 412 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
28 See Harding, supra note 7, at 455 ("The second and arguably more far reaching
consequence [of Prima Paint] has been the applicability of the FAA to state court
proceedings.").
29 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Harding, supra note 7, at
449-50 (describing the Court's post-Erie options). For a more complete description of
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The majority did not pause long in answering this question, devoting
barely a paragraph to its analysis. It concluded that "it is clear beyond
dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to
the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate
commerce and over admiralty. '' 30 Not surprisingly, Justice Black was
incredulous in his dissent on this point. He again turned to the legislative
history, which appeared to bolster his point that Congress "relied
primarily on its power to create general federal rules to govern federal
courts" in promulgating the FAA.31 In the end, Justice Black sounded the
federalism theme that has been echoed by commentators (as well as
some courts) ever since. He stressed the need to find the agreement
"valid and legally existent under state law" and bemoaned the ability
given to federal courts by the majority to fashion federal law
"inconsistent with state law."
32
To Justice Black's chagrin, Prima Paint laid the groundwork for the
expansion of the FAA into state courts. Two decades later, in Southland
Corp. v. Keating,33 the Court took this next logical step and applied the
FAA to state courts.34 The effects of Prima Paint and Southland should
not be underestimated: "[b]y binding to the terms of the FAA all state
courts, where most contract litigation takes place, the Supreme Court
greatly extended the reach of the statute." 35 This expansion, as we shall
see below, has not arrived without consequence.
The majority in Southland confronted a decision by the California
Supreme Court holding that certain disputes were exempt (courtesy of a
state statute) from arbitration. To support its conclusion that the FAA
applied in state courts and preempted inconsistent state law, the Court
returned to Prima Paint, suggesting that Prima Paint made this result
inevitable: "[t]he statements of the Court in Prima Paint that the
Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly
implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well
the history surrounding the diversity question and arbitration, see Stephen L. Hayford &
Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54
FLA. L. REv. 175, 186-89 (2002); Linda R. Hirshnan, The Second Arbitration Trilogy:
The Federalization ofArbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1309-21 (1985).3 0 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1 (1924); S. REP. No.
536, at 3 (1924)).
31 Id. at 418 (Black, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 422 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black repeatedly stressed that the
outcome in Prima Paint would have differed had it been brought in state court. Id. at
424-25.
33 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
34 By the time Southland was handed down, "[t]he clash between federal and state
law was unavoidable ... " Harding, supra note 7, at 461.
35 Hirshman, supra note 29, at 1346.
2004-20051
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as federal courts." 36 Sidestepping "ambiguities" in the legislative history,
the Court focused on the congressional purpose behind the FAA as well
as the practical implications of a contrary rule.37
Dissenting in Southland, Justice O'Connor embarked on a tour of the
FAA's legislative history, which convinced her that Congress never
intended to compel application of the FAA in state courts. Because she
believed that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as merely a procedural
mechanism, 38 the statute could not be wielded as a substantive right for
preemption purposes.39 The federalism theme is echoed throughout her
dissent. °
Prima Paint and Southland emanate from the Supreme Court's
functionalist interpretation of the FAA. 4 ' Although many argue that the
Court elevated policy goals above legislative history, even Justice
O'Connor, who authored the stinging dissent in Southland, has since
acquiesced in the Court's end result.42 Justice Thomas appears to be the
36 Southland, 465 U.S. at 12.
37 Id. at 13-15; see also Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 192 ("[T]he Court
chose to remake jurisdictional history, transporting the jurisdictionally cautious 1925
statute into the rich post-New Deal jurisdictional environment."). For a recent defense of
the Southland majority's view of legislative history, see Christopher R. Drahozal, In
Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002).
38 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Congress believed that
the FAA established nothing more than a rule of procedure, a rule therefore applicable
only in the federal courts.").
39 This analysis, of course, is built on Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint. See
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
40 See, e.g., Southland, 465 U.S. at 23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Congress
intended to require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.").
41 See, e.g., Harding, supra note 7, at 463-64; Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at
189 ("And as federal dockets became more congested, the Court became increasingly
sympathetic toward the arbitration alternative."). But see Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L.
REv. 931, 956-61 (1999) (finding the docket management explanation unsatisfying). For
contemporary commentary on the FAA, see Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The
New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265 (1926).
42 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring):
Though wrong, Southland has not proved unworkable and, as always,
'Congress remains free to alter what we have done.' Today's decision caps this
Court's efforts to expand the Federal Arbitration Act. Although each decision
has built logically upon the decisions preceding it, the initial building block in
Southland laid a faulty foundation. I acquiesce in today's judgment because
there is no 'special justification' to overrule Southland.
Id. at 284 (intemal citations omitted); cf Drahozal, supra note 37, at 105 ("[Tlhere are
Istrong indications' in the legislative history that the drafters of the FAA intended it to
apply in state court .... ").
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only justice who continues to insist that the FAA does not apply in state
courts. 43 This perception of judicial efficacy has contributed to the
criticisms of the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration march and, more
specifically, to Prima Paint itself. In the aftermath of Southland and two
other notable Supreme Court arbitration decisions, 44 one commentator
concluded that only "genuinely arbitration-specific but content-neutral
state laws . . .present[] a viable limit on the scope of the federal
arbitration scheme. ''45 Given the ever-shrinking province of state law in
the arbitration realm, it is not surprising that Prima Paint and its progeny
have engendered a backlash, fueled in large part by federalism concerns.
C. Severability Under Fire
Despite the fact that Prima Paint's severability doctrine has emerged
as one of the "cornerstones" of arbitration law, it has come under
increasing attack in recent years. Countless commentators have called for
the modification, if not outright repeal, of the severability doctrine.
47
What seems to trouble most commentators is that the severability
doctrine is a fiction that some believe is cut from whole cloth.48 While
43 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 459 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("I continue to believe that the Federal Arbitration Act... does not apply to
proceedings in state court."). Although Justice Scalia had previously sided with Justice
Thomas on this issue, he did not join Justice Thomas' dissent in Bazzle.
44 The other two cases of the FAA trilogy are Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985), and Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
4" Hirshman, supra note 29, at 1336-37. Professors Hayford and Palmiter elaborate
on the role of state law in application of the FAA in Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29,
at 175.
46 Rau, supra note 19, at 331.
47 See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's
Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 789 (2002); Richard C. Reuben, First Optics, Consent to Arbitration, and the
Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration
Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 827 (2003) (arguing that "the separability doctrine
should be repudiated as archaic, unworkable, and broader than necessary to accomplish
its legitimate policy goals"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65
TuL. L. REV. 1377, 1456 (1991) ("Prima Paint must be modified ...."); Van Wezel
Stone, supra note 41, at 948-49 (criticizing Prima Paint); Stephen J. Ware, Employment
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 135 (1996) (arguing that the
Supreme Court should overrule Prima Paint's severability doctrine); Todd Baker,
Comment, Arbitration: Arbitration in the 21st Century: Where We 've Been, Where We're
Going, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 653 (2000).
4 Justice Black dubbed the Court's reasoning "fantastic." Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at
407 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Stempel, supra note 47, at 1456 ("Prima Paint is
premised on a false dichotomy to the extent that it separates issues of consent to the
arbitration clause from issues of consent to the entire contract."); Ware, supra note 47, at
2004-2005]
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Prima Paint has been challenged on a number of grounds, perhaps the
most persuasive attack, and the one now gaining widest currency, is
based on federalism concerns. 49 Commentators have maintained that
Prima Paint accomplished a fundamental shift in "arbitration federalism"
because it "displaced state arbitration law in federal court." 50 This shift,
however, has precipitated vigorous challenges to the new regime.
Singing the federalism tune, other commentators have attacked the
federal government's "intru[sion] into states' abilities to protect their
citizens"5 through a broad application of the FAA and have argued that
"[e]ach state should have the opportunity to fashion its own laws to
provide procedural and substantive protections during arbitration."
' 52
They have also documented a "much deeper level of reticence in the
states" to the severability rule and have surmised that "the states do not
view separability as a rule of such overwhelmingly normative
desirability as to compel unanimity."5 3 For their part, state-court judges
have allowed federalism concerns to influence their analysis on the
Prima Paint question.
54
131 ("The severability doctrine is a legal fiction . ). But see Rau, supra note 19, at
341 ("The thrust of the notion of 'separability,' then, is not merely to create a fiction by
which we can overcome the conceptual horror of an arbitral decision of contract
invalidity that 'calls into question the validity of the arbitration clause from which [the
arbitrators] derive their power.") (internal citations omitted).
49 The remainder of the grounds will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV, infra
notes 218-78 and accompanying text.
'a Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 189; see also Baker, supra note 47, at 680
("Federal decisions should not infringe upon individual states' power to interpret the law
of their respective states.").
5' Pittman, supra note 47, at 791.
52 Id. at 798. Concerning Prima Paint, Professor Pittman posits that:
one can conclude that Prima Paint is just another case of the Court's
'evolutive' interpretation in favor of a broad all-encompassing application of
the FAA that serves the Court's own desires to reduce the workload in the
courts even if such a desire is contrary to congressional intent and purposes.
Id. at 861. Even those who do not necessarily challenge Prima Paint readily acknowledge
that "the Court has significantly federalized commercial arbitration." Hayford & Palmiter,
supra note 29, at 176.
53 Reuben, supra note 47, at 852. Professor Reuben catalogs various states by
whether they have embraced Prima Paint. Id. at 852-54. This analysis is questionable,
however, because it does not clarify whether it is limited to contracts governed by the
FAA or to all contracts. More importantly, some of the representative cases do not
actually support the categorization. For example, the study claims that Florida
"reject[ed]" Prima Paint in its Party Yards decision. Id. at 854 n.206. As is explained
below, the Florida appellate court declined to extend Prima Paint in that case to void
contracts, but it did not purport to repudiate the severability doctrine. See infra note 223
and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., Onvoy, Inc. v. Shal, L.L.C., 669 N.W.2d 344, 359 (Minn. 2003) (Gilbert,
J., concurring in part) ("We must therefore be vigilant to preserve and improve
Minnesota's ADR system where possible and should not be so eager to defer to the
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Arbitral bodies, on the other hand, have embraced the severability
doctrine. The American Arbitration Association's commercial dispute
rules exemplify this position:
The arbitrator shall have the power to determine the existence or
validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part. Such
an arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitrator that the contract
is null and void shall not for that reason alone render invalid the
arbitration clause.55
An important reality drives rules such as these: if a holding by the
arbitrator that invalidated the contract thereby deprived the arbitrator of
jurisdiction, it might send the arbitration system careening into chaos.
5 6
Parties would spend considerable time and expense proceeding through
arbitration, only to be told at the end of their journey to return to court to
recommence the whole exercise. This would also (perhaps subtly,
perhaps not) encourage arbitrators not to find that the underlying contract
was invalid for precisely the same reasons.
Suffice it to say, the battle over Prima Paint carries important
consequences. Those championing a retreat from severability may be
encouraged by a recent line of state-court decisions refusing to apply
Prima Paint to claims involving purportedly void contracts. As discussed
more fully below, these decisions are motivated more by federalism
concerns than adherence to FAA norms.
II. A QUESTION OF ASSENT
The landscape of authority on the void/voidable question reveals
three possible means for challenging the arbitrability of a dispute. A
party might argue: 1) that at least one of the parties did not assent to the
agreement in the first instance; 2) that the underlying agreement is void
(generally based on state law), thereby preventing enforcement of an
arbitration clause contained in the contract; or 3) that no contract exists
because the contract is voidable for some reason. Prima Paint provides
federal system unless clearly required under federal law."). Onvoy is discussed in greater
detail below. See infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
" American Arbitration Association Commercial Rule 7(b), available at
http://www.adr.org. See also infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
56 See Rau, supra note 19, at 341; Monestier, supra note 1I, at 227 ("The doctrine is
necessary to ensure that an arbitrator's jurisdiction is not clouded by challenges to the
validity of the underlying contract.").
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an explicit answer to the third scenario, but litigants, courts, and
commentators divide over how to reconcile the other two situations.
Closer inspection of the case law unveils the source of the
misunderstanding. While courts are generally in agreement that cases in
the first category (no assent) should not be arbitrated because one of the
parties has not consummated an agreement to arbitrate, this harmony
unravels when courts and commentators seek to utilize the concept of
"no arbitration for want of assent" within the void contract realm.
Contracts without assent are void. However, that does not mean that all
void contracts escape arbitration.
Part of the problem arises because the focus on whether a contract is
void or voidable in conjunction with determining arbitrability really asks
the wrong question. The touchstone of arbitrability is assent. As a result,
courts should ask whether the parties manifested assent to arbitrate
instead of embarking on the void/voidable analysis. However, because
courts have generally confronted the issue within the void/voidable
framework, this article will assess how courts have responded to this
question. Part IV will return to the matter of reframing the question with
a focus on assent.
A. The "Signatory Power" Cases
Before analyzing the cases that specifically address the void contract
argument, it is necessary to survey the so-called "signatory power" cases.
This line of federal appellate cases stands for the proposition that when
signatory power is implicated, such as when the party challenging
arbitrability claims forgery or that its agent lacked authority to bind it to
the agreement, a court, rather than an arbitrator, must determine whether
the contract exists. The leading cases cited for this proposition hail from
the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 57 Commentators and litigants
alike have misconstrued this authority, however, and sought to utilize it
as support for the proposition that courts must always pass on alleged
void contracts. 58 These cases do not support such a rule; rather, they
highlight the role that assent plays under the FAA.
57 See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000); Chastain
v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Three Valleys Mun. Water
Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991). Other cases generally cited in
similar vein include 1S. Joseph Co. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1986)
and Sphere Drake Ins. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001). In All
American Insurance Co., Judge Easterbrook famously quipped, "No contract, no power."
Id. at 591.
58 See, e.g., Egle, supra note 11, at 212 ("The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits




The progenitor of this line of cases is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co. '9
Dissenting in Three Valleys, Judge Hall feared that the majority's
opinion would "transform this area of the law into a morass of
questionable distinctions." 60 While this prediction has unfortunately
proven to be accurate, the signatory power cases can be harmonized with
the void contract authority.
Three Valleys involved a scenario in which the party challenging
arbitrability claimed that the agent who signed the contract in question
lacked authority to bind the principal. The defendant prevailed at the
district court by arguing that Prima Paint required an arbitrator to
determine any issue regarding the underlying contract-including the
threshold question of contract assent.61 The Ninth Circuit, however,
refused to read Prima Paint "so broadly" and instead limited the
62
severability doctrine to attempts to avoid or rescind a contract. In other
words, challenges "to the very existence of a contract that a party claims
63
never to have agreed to" may secure a judicial audience. To emphasize
this point, the Ninth Circuit painted a parade of horribles about what
might transpire if the district court's rule prevailed:
A contrary rule would lead to untenable results. Party A could forge
party B's name to a contract and compel party B to arbitrate the
question of the genuineness of its signature. Similarly, any citizen of
Los Angeles could sign a contract on behalf of the city and Los
Angeles would be required to submit to an arbitrator the question
whether it was bound to the contract, even if its charter prevented it
from engaging in any arbitration.
64
The court explained that Prima Paint applied to "voidable"
contracts,65 which seemed to imply that it did not extend to "void"
such as in situations where a party asserts that the arbitration clause is invalid because the
underlying contract is void from its very inception.").
59 Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir.
1991).
60 Id. at 1147 (Hall, J., dissenting in part).
61 This is precisely the oversimplification criticized by Professor Rau. See Rau,
supra note 19, at 333.






contracts.66 The language selected by the Ninth Circuit ultimately gen-
erated considerable confusion: "a party who contests the making of a
contract containing an arbitration provision cannot be compelled to
arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.
Only a court can make that decision., 67 While the Ninth Circuit spoke of
the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, subsequent cases have subtly
shifted focus to the "existence" of the underlying agreement.
68
Judge Hall, however, was unmoved by the majority's concerns.
Highlighting the risks of focusing on the contract's existence, she
cautioned that "if disputes that concern the 'making' of contracts must be
litigated rather than subjected to arbitration, arbitration's potential as an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism is substantially limited."' 69
Instead, Judge Hall sought to focus the analysis on section 4 of the FAA
and Prima Paint, arguing that the court should limit its inquiry to the
making of the agreement to arbitrate.7°
2. Chastain
The Eleventh Circuit, in Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co.,71
dealt almost exactly with the hypothetical situation posed by the Ninth
Circuit in Three Valleys. The case involved a dispute over a securities
trading account that the customer attempted to pursue in litigation.
Although the defendant had a customer agreement purportedly signed by
the plaintiff containing a broad arbitration clause, all parties recognized
that the signature on the agreement did not belong to the plaintiff.
72
When the defendant moved to compel arbitration, the plaintiff submitted
a detailed affidavit explaining that she had never signed the agreement at
issue, and the defendant never disputed that fact.73 While the defendant
pointed to Prima Paint in an effort to support arbitrability of the dispute,
66 Subsequent Ninth Circuit authority has clarified, however, that Prima Paint
indeed applies to void contracts. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
Commentators have nevertheless interpreted Three Valleys as drawing such a distinction.
See, e.g., Monestier, supra note 11, at 225 ("The Ninth Circuit in Three Valleys clearly
demarcated between contracts that are voidable at the option of one of the parties and
those that are void ab initio.").
6 7Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1140-41 (internal footnote omitted). In a footnote, the
court dismissed the defendant's contention that this was essentially adopting Justice
Black's position from his Prima Paint dissent. Id. at 1141 n.4.
68 See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 106 (3d Cir. 2000).
69 Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1145 (Hall, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 1145-47. She also argued that this result was dictated by prior Ninth Circuit
precedent. See Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990).
"' Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (1 1th Cir. 1992).




the Eleventh Circuit refused to extend the severability doctrine quite that
far, explaining, "Prima Paint has never been extended to require
arbitrators to adjudicate a party's contention, supported by substantial
evidence, that a contract never existed at all.",74 In support of this notion,
the Eleventh Circuit cited Three Valleys and quoted the hypothetical
posed by the Ninth Circuit regarding forgery.75 Though the court did not
specify what quantum of evidence would be sufficient to initially defeat
arbitration, it did require the party resisting arbitration to "substantiate




Another case often cited in tandem with Three Valleys and Chastain
is the Third Circuit's decision in Sandvik A.B. v. Advent International
Corp.77 Sandvik involved a commercial dispute between two parties to a
joint-venture agreement with a curious twist. The party that brought suit
to enforce the contract (Sandvik) simultaneously opposed the other
party's (Advent) motion to compel arbitration, while Advent, which
maintained that its agent did not have authority to enter into the
agreement, sought to enforce the arbitration provision as severable under
Prima Paint.78 After sorting through the factual and procedural morass,
the Third Circuit turned to the crux of the case. Like Three Valleys, the
case raised the question of whether an allegation that a party lacked
signatory power could (at least temporarily) defeat arbitration. Although
Advent raised the Prima Paint banner, the Third Circuit quickly
recognized that Prima Paint "did not grapple with what is to be done
when a party contends not that the underlying contract is merely voidable,
but that no contract ever existed.' 79 Turning to Three Valleys for support,
the Third Circuit concluded "that the doctrine of severability presumes
an underlying, existent, agreement." 80 The shift in emphasis of "exist-
ence" from Three Valleys was thus completed.
While Sandvik may have been explainable enough if it had stopped
at that point, the Third Circuit continued to elaborate on the
void/voidable distinction: "We draw a distinction between contracts that
" Id. at 855.
75 id.
76 Id. Of course, the detail in the plaintiff's affidavit, when coupled with the
defendant's acknowledgment of the forgery, easily satisfied this threshold.
77 Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
78 Id. at 100.
79 Id. at 105.
" Id. at 106.
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are 'asserted to be void' or non-existent, as is contended here, and thus
are merely 'voidable,' as was the contract at issue in Prima Paint, for
purposes of evaluating whether the making of an arbitration agreement is
in dispute." 8' Despite the fact that the contract at issue in Sandvik was
alleged to be non-existent because the agent lacked signatory power, the
Third Circuit painted with a broader brush in its discussion of void
contracts. Recapitulating prior precedent, the court concluded that its
jurisprudence "supports distinguishing between void and voidable
contracts. 82 The court then purported to expand the significance of this
distinction to the Prima Paint context, notwithstanding its recognition
that Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint appeared to imply that the
majority rejected the void/voidable distinction. 83 The court justified its
minimalization of Justice Black's dissent by concluding that Justice
Black was really just talking about voidable, not void, contracts.
84
At first glance, the opinion in Sandvik appears to support the notion
that void contracts should be excluded from the severability doctrine.
However, the Third Circuit's extended discussion of void contracts is, in
large part, dicta.85 The basis of the holding rested on the same signatory
power issue that motivated the Ninth Circuit in Three Valleys. Any
attempt to sweep all void contracts within the ambit of that holding asks
too much. Moreover, the court was in actuality applying the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
("CREFAA"), 6 which is in many respects similar to the FAA. However,
CREFAA contains an important distinction. In one of its provisions, it
provides that a court refer matters to arbitration "unless it finds that the
said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed., 8 1 While it is unclear exactly how much weight the Third
Circuit attributed to this aspect of CREFAA, the court did take care to
point out that its conclusion was consistent with the "null and void"
" Id. at 107.
82 Id. at 109. In this regard, the court cited Conners v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d
483 (3d Cir. 1994), a case that did not involve Prima Paint.
" Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 110 n.9.
84 Id. As explained throughout this article, the confusion over void and voidable
contracts (as indicated in Sandvik) counsels against relying on the difference to draw a
bright line distinction for arbitrability.
85 District courts, however, appear to have taken Sandvik's dicta seriously. The
Middle District of Pennsylvania interpreted Sandvik as holding that the severability
doctrine "does not permit enforcement when the encompassing contract is considered
void ab initio." Bertram v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457
(M.D. Pa. 2003).
86 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
87 Id. at art. 2, § 3.
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provision of CREFAA. 88 Obviously, the FAA contains no provision
resembling the null and void clause of CREFAA.
B. Assent and the FAA
Motivating these decisions is the underlying notion of contractual
assent. Not only is assent one of the basic cornerstones of contract
formation, but it is also a foundation upon which the FAA is built.89 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of assent in the
context of the FAA: "[T]he first task of a court asked to compel
arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate that dispute." 90 Accordingly, courts recognize a "fundamental
principle" of arbitration: that "arbitration cannot be forced upon a party
absent its consent." 91 Professor Rau accurately captures the point: "The
need to find such assent is a conceptual cornerstone of Prima
Paint .. . ."92 The question of assent in the context of the severability
doctrine walks hand-in-hand with the mandate of section 4 of the FAA
that asks whether the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate has been put
in issue. 93 Congress wanted to be sure that, before directing parties to
arbitration, the court was comfortable that they had actually agreed to
that method of dispute resolution. After all, an agreement to arbitrate
forsakes a party's constitutional right to a jury trial, as well as other
procedural benefits of litigation. Therefore, imbedded in the basic
structure of the FAA is a need to establish that the parties actually agreed
to arbitrate in the first place.94 Unfortunately, the question of assent often
seems to get lost in the void/voidable jurisprudence discussed below.
88 Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 110. However, in a subsequent opinion, the Third Circuit
took care to minimize the distinction between CREFAA and the FAA: "Notably,
although we supported our conclusion [in Sandvik] with references to the 'null and void'
language in Article II of the Convention, we based our decision on straightforward
notions of contract law rather than on any technical interpretation of the language of the
treaty." China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 282
(3d Cir. 2003).
89 Illustrating the importance of assent, Professor Barnett argues for a consent theory
of contractual obligation. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contracts, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
90 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solee Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985); see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293-94 (2002).
91 Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Samson Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2003).
92 Rau, supra note 19, at 336; see also id. at 335-36 (recognizing that "the only
important question" for Prima Paint "is the existence of a legally enforceable assent to
submit to arbitration"); id. at 303 ("[A]ctual consent is both sufficient and necessary as a
foundation for arbitral jurisdiction.").
9' 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
94 This argument should also answer, at least in part, critics of the severability
doctrine. See, e.g., Van Wezel Stone, supra note 41, at 965 ("Thus, the effect of the
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III. TACKLING THE VOID/VOIDABLE QUESTION
A. Void and Voidable Contracts
While courts may become bogged down in labeling contracts as void
or voidable, the distinction may, as a practical matter in the arbitration
realm, be elusive.95 In simplest terms, voidable contracts are those which
"one or more parties have the power, by a manifestation of election to do
so, to avoid the legal relations created by the contract, or by ratification
of the contract to extinguish the power of avoidance," 96 while for void
contracts "the law neither gives a remedy nor otherwise recognizes a
duty of performance by the promisor.
97
The problem in placing undue reliance on the formulistic distinction
between void and voidable contracts is largely twofold. First, the end
result for both types of contracts-assuming the disadvantaged party
does not wish to ratify the agreement-is the same: the contract is
unenforceable. 98 Dwelling on the somewhat metaphysical question of
whether the contract came into existence in the first place is thus, at the
end of the day, a red herring. While the question may be of academic
interest (or a quagmire for first-year contracts students), it has no
practical relevance unless a rigid distinction between void and voidable
contracts is drawn under the FAA.
Second, and perhaps most important, the distinction between void
and voidable contracts is not a bright line. For example, contracts that
once were considered void are now labeled as voidable, 99 some courts
disagree about whether certain types of contracts are void or voidable,'(.
and some types of contracts are void in some instances but voidable in
separability doctrine is to restrict, if not eliminate, contractual defenses based on lack of
consent when arbitration clauses are involved.").
95 See, e.g., Monestier, supra note 11, at 235 (recognizing that the void/voidable
distinction is "highly artificial" for purposes of severability because in both cases "the
agreement of the parties is not legally binding"); Rau, supra note 19, at 336 n.129
(calling the distinction between void and voidable contracts in this context "little more
than formalism, a pointless verbal game"); Ware, supra note 47, at 134 (noting that it is
"often difficult to distinguish" between void and voidable contracts).
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981).
97 Id. § 7 cmt. a.
9" We see the confusion on this point reflected in Justice Black's Prima Paint dissent,
where he imagines that a court could find the contract "void because of fraud in the
inducement." Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting).
99 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 27.2 (2002) (recognizing that
contracts with minors "formerly ... were void" but that "[i]t is almost everywhere agreed
that even such transactions are merely voidable rather than void").
100 Id. § 27.10 (recognizing that contracts with the mentally infirm are largely held to
be voidable, but acknowledging contrary authority).
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others. '1 Commentators have accordingly cautioned against placing
undue reliance on this largely artificial distinction. 10 2 Courts, on the other
hand, although sometimes criticizing the distinction, have generally
gravitated towards it for analytical purposes under the FAA.1
0 3
Perhaps illustrating the need to avoid rigid adherence to the
void/voidable distinction for purposes of arbitrability, one district court
recently considered whether a plaintiffs attack on arbitration should be
classified as fraudulent inducement (voidable) or fraud in the factum
(void). 10 4 To answer this question, the court was obliged to consider the
origins of the distinction, and it accordingly provided a history of the
doctrine hearkening back to "medieval England."'0 5 After concluding
this tour (and concluding that the allegation was fraudulent inducement),
the court acknowledged the absurdity of its task: "We cannot resist
noting the irony in how a distinction created by sixteenth-century courts
of equity to attract cases from the courts of law provided the opportunity
for the federal courts to deflect adjudicatory responsibility onto
arbitrators."' 06 Ill-suited though it may be, courts continue to conduct
this analysis and therefore it is important to understand how they have
sought to reconcile these questions.
B. Federal Courts Respond to the Void Contract Argument
1. Recent Rejections of This Argument
With the signatory power cases in mind, it is appropriate to shift
focus to the federal treatment of the void contract question, where a trio
of recent decisions confirm that federal courts permit such matters to be
arbitrated. The first of the trio, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Burden v.
Check Into Cash of Kentucky, L.L. C.,10 7 involved plaintiffs seeking to
avoid Prima Paint's severability doctrine by claiming that the underlying
contracts violated state usury laws and thus were void ab initio. 108
10 Id. § 28.8 ("Normally, duress renders a transaction voidable at the election of the
coerced party. In highly unusual situations, however, duress renders the transaction
void.").
102 See supra note 95.
.03 See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir.
2001) ("Although this is a distinction that may have a metaphysical ring, it is a useful
distinction for present purposes.").1
04 Giannone v. Ayne Inst., 290 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561-64 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
'0' Id. at 563-64.
'6 Id. at 564 n.14.
107 Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., L.L.C., 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001).
'0' Id. at 486.
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Reasoning that a contract that never came into existence could not bind a
party to arbitration, the plaintiffs pointed to the signatory power line of
cases, arguing that those cases refused arbitration when the underlying
contract never existed. 109 While acknowledging that "[sleveral of our
sister circuits have found that Prima Paint does not apply to allegations
of nonexistent contracts," the Sixth Circuit recognized that these
authorities generally involve "questions of signatory power, not contract
content."1 0 The court found that, because the challenge to arbitrability in
the case before it did not involve the narrow question of signatory power
(because plaintiffs conceded that they executed the contracts at issue),
the attack on the contract as a whole (including arguments based on
allegations of illegality) had to be decided by an arbitrator, consistent
with Prima Paint.
I I
Although the end result in Burden is clear enough, the circuitous
route by which the court arrived there has engendered much confusion." 2
The Sixth Circuit began its Prima Paint analysis by noting that the Third
and Ninth Circuits had previously held that the severability doctrine
"applies to voidable, but not void, contracts." '"13 Proceeding from this
premise, the Sixth Circuit then appeared to attribute significance to the
void/voidable distinction, characterizing it as "relevant for Prima Paint
analysis because a void contract, unlike a voidable contract, was never a
contract at all."' 1 4 While at this point in the opinion the plaintiffs may
have expected victory, the Sixth Circuit quickly did an about-face.
Citing a prior Sixth Circuit case" 5 wherein the court discussed the fraud
in the factum/fraud in the inducement distinction for arbitration purposes,
the Burden court concluded that:
It is not clear that citation to Prima Paint, without more, answers the
void ab initio question, inasmuch as Prima Paint failed to address the
void ab initio question. Indeed, if anything, we are inclined to find that
Prima Paint supports, rather than prohibits, excluding nonexistent
'0o Id. at 488-89.
110 Id.
"'. See id. at 490.
112 Welsh, supra note 11, at 607 (characterizing the Burden analysis as "haphazard").
In light of some of Burden's confusing language, one district judge, sitting by designation
on the Sixth Circuit, criticized the analysis and called for the entire Circuit to revisit
Burden. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Kean-
Argovitz Resorts, 383 F.3d 512, 518-21 (6th Cir. 2004) (Cleland, J., concurring). The
full Circuit declined the invitation. See 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24581 (6th Cir. Nov. 18,
2004) (denying rehearing en banc petition).
" Burden, 267 F.3d at 488 (citing Sandvik and Three Valleys). As shown above,
this conclusion oversimplifies the cases cited by Burden.
114 Id.
i's C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.,
912 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1990).
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contracts from the severability doctrine, because an allegation of a void
contract raises exactly the same question as an allegation of a
fraudulently induced arbitration agreement: whether the arbitrator has
any power at all.
1 16
After this detour, the Sixth Circuit professed to avoid the question it
had raised concerning void/voidable contracts and arbitration.'17 At the
same time, however, it set limits on the scope of the Third and Ninth
Circuits' precedent relied upon by the plaintiffs, concluding that these
cases spoke of contract assent rather than contract content. 118 In other
words, any attempt to avoid arbitration by challenging the content of the
underlying contract-as the plaintiffs did by raising the illegality
defense-would fail based on Prima Paint. To be sure, the Sixth Circuit
declined to opine on the precise Three Valleys scenario, but its end result
suggests that claiming that a contract is "void" will only suffice to avoid
arbitration if signatory consent is implicated. 19
In refusing to allow void ab initio allegations to defeat arbitrability,
both the Eleventh Circuit in Bess v. Check Express' 20 and the Fourth
Circuit in Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing121 embraced Burden
without dwelling on its problematic dicta. 22 Both cases involved almost
identical factual scenarios, with the plaintiffs selecting judicial forums
based on claims that the underlying contracts were void ab initio as
illegal under state law.
The Fourth Circuit in Snowden paid little heed to these arguments.
Framing the issue within the context of Prima Paint, the Fourth Circuit
explained that the severability doctrine generally channeled attacks on
the underlying contract to arbitration. A possible exception arises, as
recognized by the Sixth Circuit in Burden, when the "party seeking to
avoid arbitration contends that it never assented in the first place to the
contract containing the arbitration provision.' ' 123 In the Fourth Circuit's
view, challenges like the plaintiffs', based on illegality, did not provide a
"viable basis" for avoiding arbitration because they implicate the
'
16 Burden, 267 F.3d at 489.
1171d.
118 id.
119 The Sixth Circuit recently clarified that it accepts the exception carved out by
Three Valleys. See Fazio v. Lehman Bros., 340 F.3d 386, 397 (6th Cir. 2003).
120 Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11 th Cir. 2002).
121 Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002).
122 In reaching its result, the Fourth Circuit "note[d] that our conclusion is squarely
in accord with the Sixth Circuit's recent and well-reasoned decision in Burden .... In
that case, the Sixth Circuit rejected the same void ab initio arguments that Snowden
presses in the present appeal." Snowden, 290 F.3d at 637-38.
123 Id. at 637.
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contract as a whole and thus fall within the Prima Paint doctrine. 124 To
support its position, the Fourth Circuit turned to Burden.125
Bess likewise involved an attack on a contract containing an
arbitration clause, claimed by the plaintiff to be illegal under state law.
The Eleventh Circuit refused this attempt to avoid arbitration,
recognizing that the plaintiff "challenges the content of the contracts, not
their existence.' 26 As a result, allegations that the contract was a product
of or permeated by illegality did not place the "making of the arbitration
agreement in issue."'12 7 Under Prima Paint, a claim that a contract is void
ab initio thus "is an issue for the arbitrator," not for the court.1
28
Upon considering plaintiff's arguments based on the signatory power
line of cases, Bess paid particular attention to the court's prior decision in
Chastain before concluding:
[T]he focus of the court's decision in Chastain, as just explained, was
on the question of assent, i.e., whether the parties mutually had agreed
to the contracts. By contrast, Colburn urges that the transactions in this
case are void, not because he failed to assent to the essential terms of
the contracts, but because those terms allegedly render the contracts
illegal under Alabama law. At bottom, Colbum challenges the content
of the contracts, not their existence. Indeed, unlike the contracts in
Chastain, both the arbitration agreement and the deferred payment
contracts were signed by Colbum, and there is no question about
Colbum's assent to those contracts.
129
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit, which issued the Chastain opinion, has
subsequently explained that it cannot support the notion that void
contracts are exempt from the Prima Paint rule.'
30
124 id.
125 Id. at 637-38.
126 Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11 th Cir. 2002).
127 Id. at 1304 (internal quotations omitted).
... d. at 1306.
129d. at 1305-06.
130 Lest any doubt remain, the Eleventh Circuit soon reiterated the Bess holding in
John B. Goodman, Ltd. v. THF Construction, Inc., 321 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 2003).
Recognizing that the court in Bess had "held the issue of whether the deferred payment
transactions were void as illegal was for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide," the
Eleventh Circuit again applied this reasoning to compel arbitration notwithstanding a
challenge to the legality of the underlying contract. Id. at 1096. Because the plaintiff
"challenges the performance of the contracts, not their existence," and because plaintiff
did not contest assent to the contracts, "this case falls within the 'normal circumstances'
as explained in Prima Paint, Chastain, and Bess, in which the parties signed a
presumptively valid agreement to arbitrate any disputes, including those relating to the
validity or enforceability of the underlying contract." Id. at 1096 (emphasis omitted).
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In Burden, Snowden, and Bess, the plaintiffs marshaled the same
array of authority, but in each case the federal appellate courts
recognized that these cases involved "questions of signatory power, not
contract content."1 31 As a result, the courts refused to extend the signa-
tory power cases to encompass all void contracts.
2. Summarizing the Federal Perspective
Other federal circuits appear generally to be in accord with the views
of the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, as the First, Fifth, Seventh,
and D.C. Circuits have all reached similar results. 132 While some of these
cases do not specifically address the void contract issue, no other circuit
(with the possible exceptions of the Second and Third) has refused to
extend Prima Paint to void contracts. 133 One could argue that the
Supreme Court has encouraged this trend by enforcing arbitration
agreements notwithstanding underlying challenges based on the
1' Bess, 294 F.3d at 1305-06; Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., L.L.C., 267 F.3d
483, 489 (6th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing All American Ins. Co., Sandvik, Three Valleys,
and Chastain); Snowden, 290 F.3d at 637 (same).
132 See, e.g., Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002)
(finding that the district court erroneously held that Prima Paint did not apply "to
defenses which render a contract void"); Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d
49, 53 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[Plaintiffs] do not allege that [defendant] engaged in illegal
conduct with respect to the arbitration clause itself."); Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v.
Dial-A-Mattress Int'l, 1 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1993); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Consol. Rail, 892 F.2d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court "erred
in treating the arbitration clause as unenforceable merely because the substantive contract
provision in dispute between the parties may-if the district court is correct about public
policy-be unenforceable"); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159,
1162 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Because the Lawrences do not attack the arbitration agreement
itself, Prima Paint requires that their claim of illegality be arbitrated pursuant to the
contract."); 4 AM. JUtR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 78 ("[W]here the alleged
illegality goes to a portion of the contract that does not include the arbitration agreement,
the entire controversy, including the issue of illegality, remains arbitrable.").
133 Overlooked by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, is a 2001
decision from the Second Circuit, Sphere Drake Insurance v. Clarendon National
Insurance Co., 263 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2001). Clarendon, like Sandvik, involved the
application of the CREFAA, rather than the FAA, yet some of the language employed by
the Second Circuit recognized parallels between the two regimes. Id. at 30 n.2.
In this dispute between sophisticated commercial parties, Sphere Drake sought to
avoid its commitment to arbitrate by arguing that all of the contracts in which the
arbitration provisions appeared were void ab initio. To reach such a result, Sphere Drake
posited that its agent breached fiduciary duties by entering into reinsurance contracts that
were "commercially absurd" as well as "economically disastrous." Id. at 29. In discussing
the distinction between void and voidable contracts, the Second Circuit noted the Third
Circuit's decision in Sandvik as well as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Three Valleys, two
of the "signatory power" cases described above. Id. at 31.
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") or on
violations of federal policies, such as antitrust claims. 134 Indeed, the
Sixth Circuit held arbitrable a claim of a contractual relationship gone
awry by virtue of criminal conduct in part because "claims that, if true,
amount to criminal behavior under RICO and antitrust laws have been
held arbitrable by the Supreme Court.
13 1
But can the signatory power cases sit comfortably alongside other
federal authority? Much of the confusion about the signatory power cases
can be traced to the word "existence," which courts have wielded
somewhat haphazardly. Properly understood, the use in signatory power
cases of the notion of contract existence revolves around whether the
parties agreed to arbitration in the first place. This is what the Ninth
Circuit in Three Valleys had in mind. 136 For example, if the parties a-
greed to arbitrate, but one party subsequently determined that the
contract ran afoul of state law, the underlying contract at least came into
existence, which gives an arbitrator jurisdiction. By the time we arrive at
Sandvik, however, the shift in emphasis from the existence of the
agreement to arbitrate to contract existence has been accomplished. 137
State courts have seized on this shift to justify the exclusion of void
contracts from the arbitral realm.
1 3 8
As evidence that the signatory power cases can coexist with the
Burden-Snowden-Bess trilogy, both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have subsequently explained that Prima Paint controls an allegation of a
void contract. In 3H & Associates, Inc. v. Hanjin Engineering &
Construction Co.,139 one party claimed that the underlying "contract was
illegal," and thus "arbitration could not be compelled.1 40 If the signatory
power cases truly meant that all void contracts escaped arbitration, the
134 See, e.g., PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003) (reversing
denial of arbitration when plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreements' prohibition on
punitive damages in a RICO action denied them meaningful relief); id. at 1534
("Notwithstanding Vimar's insistence that the arbitration agreement violated federal
policy as embodied in COGSA, we declined to reach the issue and held that the
arbitration clause was, at least initially, enforceable.") (describing Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995)).
1-5 Fazio v. Lehman Bros., 340 F.3d 386, 394 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003).
136 Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140-41
(9th Cir. 1991). Judge Hall dissented, however, fearing that the majority's opinion swept
more broadly. See id. at 1445-57 (Hall, J., dissenting).
137 One can easily see the possibility for confusion here. See, e.g., Reuben, supra
note 47, at 853 n.202 (equating "non-existent contracts" with "void" contracts).
138 See infra Part IV.B.
39 3H & Assoc. v. Hanjin Eng'g & Constr. Co., No. 97-16751, 1998 WL 657722, at
*2 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1998). Admittedly, Ninth Circuit rules prohibit citation to




Ninth Circuit should have agreed with this argument. Instead, the court
was dismissive, holding that it "is incorrect as a matter of law.",
1 4'
Because there was no claim that the arbitration clause was illegal, the
parties were "entitled to have an arbitrator determine whether the
contract was illegal."' 142 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Bess laid to
rest any doubts that Chastain controlled the void contract question.
43
These subsequent decisions offer some of the most persuasive evidence
that the reach of the signatory power decisions is limited, and that
reliance on the latter to support exclusion of void contracts from
arbitration is misplaced.
C. The Void Contract Question in State Courts
1. Whether Prima Paint Applies in State Courts
Because the Supreme Court grounded the severability rule on section
4 of the FAA, 44 consideration of whether the rule applies in state courts
seems first to beg the question of whether section 4 applies in state courts.
The Supreme Court has twice addressed the latter question but has never
resolved it: "[w]hile we have held that the FAA's 'substantive'
provisions-§§ 1 and 2-are applicable in state as well as federal
court... we have never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear
to apply only to proceedings in federal court . . . arc nonetheless
applicable in state court."'
145
Focusing on the section 4 issue, post-Prima Paint commentary was
initially skeptical that state courts would be bound by the Prima Paint
severability doctrine.' 46 Southland, however, seemed to dictate a contrary
141 Id.
142Id. (citing Prima Paint); see also Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co.,
937 F.2d 469, 476 (9th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Three Valleys and reversing the district
court's decision that there was no contract, and thus no arbitration clause, because it
violated Prima Paint).
143 See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
'44 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967)
("[W]e think that Congress has provided an explicit answer. That answer is to be found in
§ 4 of the Act, which provides a remedy to a party seeking to compel compliance with an
arbitration agreement.").
145 Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 n.6 (1989); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1984)
("[W]e do not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state
courts. Section 4, for example, provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply




See, e.g., P. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SysTEM, 731-32 (2d ed. 1973) (noting that Prima Paint "carefully avoided
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result, but few courts have actually paused to consider whether Prima
Paint applies at all in state courts in Southland's aftermath. 1
47
Courts have nevertheless gradually recognized that the Prima Paint
rule is one of federal substantive law, regardless of its underpinnings. 48
Indeed, when the California Supreme Court recently addressed this
matter, it relegated its discussion to a footnote:
The Prima Paint court restricted its discussion to the standard to be
applied in federal court. For that reason, and because the decision relies
on language in section 4 of the USAA, rather than section 2 ... one
might question whether its rule applies in state courts even in
transactions subject to the USAA. However, because the holding of
Prima Paint is a substantive one limiting the circumstances under
which arbitration clauses may be refused enforcement, it would appear
to preempt contrary state law under the analysis of [Southland], and
would apply in both state and federal courts.
49
Other state courts, to the extent they have considered it, appear to
agree that Prima Paint controls in contracts governed by the FAA. 150
That has not deterred state courts from refusing to apply the severability
doctrine in contracts outside the scope of the FAA' 5 ' or, as we shall see,
in applying it inconsistently with their federal counterparts.
any explicit endorsement of the view that the Arbitration Act embodied substantive
policies that were to be applied to all contracts within its scope, whether sued on in state
or federal courts"); Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate
Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFsTRA L. REv.
385, 395-96 (1992) ("Other state courts, however, refused to apply the FAA, ruling that
the holding in Prima Paint was limited to federal diversity cases."); Hirshman, supra
note 29, at 1326-27.
147 See e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About
"Separability" in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 84-85
(2003).
148 The Supreme Court has encouraged this trend. In Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), the Court cited Prima
Paint as an "example" of the FAA creating "a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act."
149 Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1073 n.8 (Cal. 1996).
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Bess confirmed that Prima Paint was a "question of
federal law" and refused the plaintiffs' efforts to apply state law for the analysis. Bess v.
Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306 n.3 (11 th Cir. 2002).
IS0 See, e.g., In re Arbitration between A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi & Dow
Chem. Co., 255 N.E.2d 774, 775-76 (N.Y. 1970) ("Prima Paint leaves no plausible
alternative but application of the Federal statute in state courts as well as in Federal
courts.").
151 Cf Reuben, supra note 47, at 854 & n.206.
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2. The Varied State Applications of Prima Paint
Notwithstanding the dictates of the Supreme Court, "[m]any courts
have simply been unwilling to follow Prima Paint."' 52 Perhaps not
surprisingly, several of these examples hail from state courts.'53 Indeed,
some commentators have actually argued that state courts are not bound
by the severability rule.1
54
Consistent with the federalism concerns about severability's reach,
some state judges have bristled at the functionalist explanation for the
Supreme Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence. In a particularly
memorable exchange between the Montana Supreme Court and its
federal counterpart, one state justice railed against "federal judges who
consider forced arbitration as the panacea for their 'heavy case loads'
and who consider the reluctance of state courts to buy into the arbitration
program as a sign of intellectual inadequacy."'155 Though perhaps not
expressed quite as bluntly, state courts in other jurisdictions have
likewise shown little enthusiasm for Prima Paint. Courts in Alabama,
South Dakota, Florida, and Minnesota have all recently refused to invoke
the Prima Paint doctrine against a claim of an underlying void contract.
As demonstrated below, the reasoning of all of these decisions is
faulty-most misinterpret authority or simply fail to cite any to support
their rulings, suggesting that federalism concerns have crept into the
decisional calculus.
152 Ware, supra note 47, at 132. Professor Reuben echoes these sentiments: "The
lower federal courts are of course obligated to follow Prima Paint's rule of separability,
although clearly they have done so with varying degrees of fidelity." Reuben, supra note
47, at 852.
153 See, e.g., Rau, supra note 19, at 332 ("Perhaps it is only natural to find the
greatest confusion in the opinions of those state courts that have only recently and
reluctantly been dragged into the modem era of arbitration-and that have been gamely,
if haplessly, struggling with what it all means.").
54 Reuben, supra note 47, at 852. As will be explained below, such a position is
difficult to defend.
155 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J.,
concurring), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.




Historically, Alabama has not been particularly fond of arbitration.56
While dragged reluctantly into the mainstream of enforcing arbitration
agreements under the FAA, vestiges of Alabama's hostility to arbitration
remain, as reflected in the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion in
Alabama Catalog Sales v. Gloria Harris M.Q., Inc. 157 Like Burden,
Snowden, and Bess, Alabama Catalog Sales arose in the context of a
deferred presentment transaction. 158
Writing before those federal decisions were handed down, the
Alabama Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether an allegation
that a contract is voided by illegality defeats arbitration. 159 Before
commencing its analysis, the court explained its view of Prima Paint,
which set the tone for the remainder of the opinion. The court stated,
"Like a majority of courts, this Court reads Prima Paint narrowly."
'1 60
Such a statement beckons further scrutiny. In support of this proposition,
the court turned to a prior Alabama decision, 16 1 which, in turn, relied on
Three Valleys. As discussed above, Three Valleys declined to extend
Prima Paint to encompass claims that a party never entered into a
contract. 162 The remainder of the "majority" of courts reading Prima
Paint narrowly, however, was never revealed.
Nevertheless, seizing on the "existence" language from Three
Valleys, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff
"challenge[d] the very existence of the contracts" by contending that they
were illegal.163 Framed thusly, the court had little trouble in concluding
that "no claims arising out of or relating to the contracts are subject to
arbitration" ' 64
1
56 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study
of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645 (1999); David F. Sawrie, Note,
Equitable Estoppel and the Outer Boundaries of Federal Arbitration Law: The Alabama
Supreme Court's Retrenchment of an Expansive Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, 51
VAND. L. REv. 721, 741-43 (1998).
157 Alabama Catalog Sales v. Gloria Harris M.Q., Inc., 794 So. 2d 312 (Ala. 2000).
158 This backdrop is important because Alabama courts have also evinced little
fondness for deferred presentment transactions, even concluding that they do not affect
interstate commerce (and thus do not trigger the FAA). See, e.g., Alternative Fin.
Solutions, L.L.C. v. Colburn, 821 So. 2d 981 (Ala. 2001).
"9 Alabama Catalog Sales, 794 So. 2d at 314.
'6 0 Id. at 314 n.2.
161 See Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Crisp, 646 So. 2d 613 (Ala. 1994).
162 See, e.g., supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
163 Alabama Catalog Sales, 794 So. 2d at 316.
164 Id. at 317. Interestingly, the court cites the Second Circuit's Interocean Shipping
Co. v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 462 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1972), as support for
this pronouncement. See Alabama Catalog Sales, 794 So. 2d at 317.
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This decision prompted a dissent. Justice See faulted the majority's
reading of Three Valleys, emphasizing that the distinction between the
cases was that the plaintiff in Alabama Catalog Sales admitted to signing
the agreement. 165 In fact, the majority in Alabama Catalog Sales
premised its opinion on a reading of Three Valleys that has been
discredited by subsequent authority. By construing Three Valleys to
preclude arbitration as long as a question was raised as to the existence
of the underlying contract, the majority's decision conflicts with the
more recent understanding that Three Valleys and cases of similar ilk do
not stand for the broad proposition that any challenge to the validity of a
contract secures a judicial forum. Rather, they emphasize that only when
the case involves "questions of assent to the general contract,' 66 does the
trial court intervene. 167 As in Sandvik, however, the confusion appears to
stem at least in part from the meaning of the word "existence." In other
words, should the court focus on the existence of the underlying contract
(as prescribed by the majority) or the existence of the agreement to
arbitrate (as the dissent would have it)?
b. South Dakota
Alabama, however, would not be the last state to refuse to apply
Prima Paint to allegedly void contracts. In Nature's 10 Jewelers v.
Gunderson,161 the South Dakota Supreme Court confronted a similar
legal issue on vastly different facts. The defendant in Nature's 10 held
itself out as a franchiser offering the opportunity to participate in the
retail sale of jewelry at discount prices. 169 The company, however, had
allowed its franchise registration (required under South Dakota law) to
expire. After this expiration, the plaintiff, who was obviously unaware
that the registration had lapsed, 170 sought to open a franchise and
165 See Alabama Catalog Sales, 794 So. 2d at 318 (Lyons, J., dissenting). Another
justice also dissented, and quoted a lengthy passage from In re Arbitration Between
Nuclear Electric Insurance, Ltd. & Central Power & Light Co., 926 F. Supp. 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). See, e.g., Alabama Catalog Sales, 794 So. 2d at 318-20 (Lyons, J.,
dissenting). However, the result in Nuclear Electric preceded the Second Circuit's
decision in Clarendon.
166 Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306 (1 th Cir. 2002).
167 In the nearly three years since Alabama Catalog Sales' issuance, no state court
outside of Alabama has even cited the decision, and the only two federal courts to
consider it have refused to follow its lead. See id. at 1306 n.3; Arnold v. Goldstar Fin.
Sys., Inc., No. 01 C 7694, 2002 WL 1941546, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2002).
1







subsequently entered into a franchise agreement with the defendant.'
7'
Only after pouring substantial funds into this endeavor did the plaintiff
discover that the company was essentially a scam: it fulfilled none of the
promises that induced the plaintiff to enter into the transaction. 1
72
In the resulting litigation, the defendant moved to compel arbitration
based on the parties' agreement, and the trial court granted the
application. 173 The case, however, took an interesting twist on appeal to
the South Dakota Supreme Court. While the plaintiff sought reversal
primarily on the basis of waiver, the court reached that result on an issue
that none of the parties even briefed: whether a void contract precludes
arbitration. 74 Seizing on the expiration of the franchise registration, a
majority of the court concluded that the underlying contract could not be
valid because it was unlawful under South Dakota law.175 The court then
reasoned that an obligation to arbitrate could not spring from a void
contract, but the only support cited for this proposition was a Florida
appellate decision.
76
Aside from resting its decision on a point never raised by either party,
perhaps the most curious feature of the majority's opinion is that it does
not even acknowledge the FAA or Prima Paint. Indeed, a reader might
understandably wonder whether the court was even applying the FAA,
given that it only cited to state statutory and decisional authority. The
dissent, however, points out that it was "uncontested" that the FAA
governed the agreement at issue. 177 Moreover, the majority could not
have simply overlooked Prima Paint because that case served as the
foundation of the dissent. 178 The majority offered no response to the
dissent's Prima Paint discussion.
171 id.
172 Id. at 806. The court chronicles these empty promises in vivid detail, which, as
described below, may help explain its end result.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 807-09 (Koncnkamp, J., dissenting). Justice Konenkamp was at a loss as to
how the court could even address the void contract issue given that neither the trial court,
nor the parties, considered it. He explained in detail why appellate courts do not pass on
such waived issues absent the most compelling circumstances. Id. ("In our system of
justice, litigants are entitled to notice that an issue is under consideration and to an
opportunity to present evidence and argument."). The majority made no effort to dispute
Justice Konenkamp's description of the record.
151 d. at 807 ("Because there was no effective registration statement on file, the
agreement between Nature's 10 and Savage was unlawful from its inception.").
176 Id. at 807 (citing Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000)) (discussed below). See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
177 Id. at 809 (Konenkamp, J., dissenting).
17s Id. at 809-10 (Konenkamp, J., dissenting). Another interesting twist in this case
is that the dissent relies on the Second Circuit's Clarendon decision to attack the majority.
See id. at 810-11. Justice Konenkamp did not engage in a detailed analysis of the
void/voidable distinction because "plaintiffs never even argued-much less produced
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What appeared to be motivating the majority was its concern about
the fraudulent nature of the defendant's representations. Although Prima
Paint directs claims of fraudulent inducement of the underlying contract
to arbitration, the majority side-stepped that issue by dwelling on the
franchise registration issue. The majority's emphasis on the broken
promises, as well as its closing point, however, betrays its true concerns:
"None of the promises were fulfilled. The corporation evaporated. This
Court will not permit the individuals who committed the illegal acts on
behalf of the corporation to benefit from the arbitration clause in the
illegal contract."' 7 9 Nature's 10 thus illustrates the dangers of a court
pre-judging a case before the allegations have been proven and allowing
it to influence the arbitrability issue. It also exemplifies a state court
elevating its public policy goals above the FAA.
c. Florida
Florida has a mixed record on the Prima Paint issue. A pair of
intermediate appellate decisions handed down prior to the Burden-
Snowden-Bess trilogy refused to apply Prima Paint to claimed void
contracts, 80 while another intermediate appellate decision written in the
wake of the federal decisions ruled to the contrary. As a result of this
conflict, the Florida Supreme Court granted review of the latter case.' 8'
In Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton,' 82 the court considered whether an
allegation that a contract was usurious (and thus illegal) would defeat
arbitrability. 183 The court answered that question in the affirmative,
although it appeared to couch its conclusion based on the language of the
agreement. The arbitration provision at issue extended to any controversy
"arising under" the agreement, and the Florida court determined that the
usury violation "does not arise under an agreement. Rather, it arises
under state statutory law."' 8 4 Citing to the principle of the FAA placing
arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contractual provisions, the
evidence to show-that the contract is void. Nor have they argued that the arbitration
clause itself is voidable." Id. at 811.
179 Id. at 807 (emphasis added).
180 See Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
FastFunding The Co. v. Betts, 758 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
181 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 824 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002), review granted, 844 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2003). The author drafted the appellate brief,
as well as the supreme court brief, for the defendant in Buckeye.
182 Party Yards, 751 So. 2d at 121.




court refused to elevate the arbitration clause above state law. 185 In
support of its ultimate holding, the Florida court relied on the line of
signatory power cases discussed supra. 186 The court did not, however,
have the benefit of the recent federal appellate decisions. 187
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,188 another Florida
appellate court followed Bess while distinguishing Party Yards, holding
that void ab initio allegations could not defeat arbitration. 189 Although
the plaintiffs in that case cited Chastain, the court recognized that
Chastain involved a situation in which one party claimed that she had not
signed the agreement at issue.' 90 Likewise, the court understood that any
consideration of Chastain had to be informed by the Eleventh Circuit's
subsequent decision in Bess, which rejected that proposition of law.' 9' As
in Bess, no question existed regarding assent to the contracts, and the
plaintiffs failed to challenge the arbitration provisions themselves:
"appellees did not argue that they did not enter into the arbitration
agreement, nor did they challenge the validity of the terms of the
arbitration agreement." 192 Absent such challenges, the plaintiffs could not
call into question the making of the agreement for arbitration, and thus
the court was required to compel arbitration.
1 93
The court also distinguished Party Yards based on the fact that the
Party Yards court limited its decision to situations where "the language
in the arbitration provision of the contract is not broad enough to
encompass a usury violation." 194 By contrast, the language of the
arbitration provisions in the contracts at issue in Buckeye "expressly
includes statutory claims and is broad enough to encompass a usury
violation."'195
With the Supreme Court of Florida poised to settle the conflict
between Buckeye and Party Yards, an interesting wrinkle has emerged in
this debate. The same appellate district that handed down Party Yards
185 Id. The focus on state law also suggests that federalism concerns influenced the
outcome.
'8' Id. at 124.
'87 A subsequent decision from the same appellate district followed Party Yards
without critical analysis. See FastFunding The Co. v. Betts, 758 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 824 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002), review granted, 844 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2003).
189 See Buckeye, 824 So. 2d at 231.
'
90 id. at 230-31.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 232.
193 Id.
194 Party Yards, Inc. v- Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
'9' Buckeye, 824 So. 2d at 231 n.l.
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appears to have reversed itself in FastFunding The Co., Inc. v. Betts.'
96
Without expressly overruling Party Yards, the court cited Buckeye
favorably: "We agree with the reasoning of the Fourth District ... 197
This recent decision also offers a graphic example of the costs involved
in forcing courts, rather than arbitrators, to decide the void contract
issue.'98
As this article was about to go to press, the Supreme Court of Florida
released its much-awaited decision in Buckeye. 99 The court continued
the trend of state courts finding that allegations of void contracts kept the
dispute out of arbitration. And, again, the court turned to the rigid
void/voidable distinction and placed reliance on the signatory power
cases. 20 When confronted with the Eleventh Circuit's contrary decision
in Bess, the majority opinion sought to distinguish it because "Bess was
expressly resolved under federal law, not state law principles., 20 ' At the
same time the court invoked Florida public policy and contract law
principles to avert arbitration, it never disputed that the matter was being
decided under the FAA.202 Nor did it offer an explanation for how such
state-law principles can escape the preemptive scope of the FAA.
196 See FastFunding The Co., Inc. v. Betts, 852 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
[hereinafter FastFunding Il].
197 Id. at 355. An intervening decision may have changed the court's tune. In Betts v.
Ace Cash Express, Inc., 827 So. 2d 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), the same appellate
district ruled that the deferred presentment transactions under attack in Buckeye and Party
Yards did not run afoul of Florida law. Because the underlying agreements could no
longer be deemed illegal and void, it took the wind out of Party Yards' sails. In fact, two
of the judges in FastFunding 11 were members of the Party Yards panel. This
development thus suggests that Party Yards was responding to a perceived inequity rather
than attempting to achieve doctrinal harmony.
198 FastFunding It made its debut before the appellate court in 2000 when the court
instructed the trial court to resolve the void contract issue. Three years after the appellate
decision, and several years after filing, the case returned for an encore in the appellate
court only for the parties to discover that they indeed had to arbitrate their dispute. Such a
result is inimical to the FAA's basic goals of resolving cases quickly and inexpensively.
199 Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., No. SC02-2161, 2005 WL 106966
(Fla. Jan. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Buckeye 1I].
200 Id. at *3.
201 Id. at *4. The majority made no other effort to distinguish (or disavow) the
wealth of federal authority. Further, the attempt to distinguish Bess overlooked the fact
that the issue of state law arose in Bess when the party resisting arbitration sought to
invoke state law to avoid arbitration (much like the plaintiffs did in Buckeye). The
Eleventh Circuit refused this invitation because federal law governed the analysis. See
Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). In other words, the
court rejected precisely the same argument that the Florida Supreme Court ultimately
followed.
202 Buckeye 11, 2005 WL 10966 at *8 (Cantero, J., dissenting) ("The parties concede
that they are governed by the FAA.").
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A concurring justice on the Florida Supreme Court concluded that
the issue was indeed one of federal law but simply refused to follow the
weight of federal authority. 20 3 He feared that the federal cases "go too far
towards treating arbitration clauses as a class of 'super' clauses, immune
from a state's otherwise generally applicable contract law. 2 °4 Dissenting,
Justice Cantero agreed that federal law governed the analysis but could
conceive of no reason for departing from the weight of federal authority.
He distinguished the signatory power cases and appreciated the
confusion caused by the void/voidable distinction:
Thus, the distinction in the cases is not between voidable contracts
(which are arbitrable) and void contracts (which are not), as the
majority finds. Rather, it is between contracts to which the plaintiff
admittedly assented, but now claims are either void or voidable, and
contracts to which the plaintiff gave no assent.
20 5
The majority did not respond to these points in its opinion.
e. Minnesota
In Onvoy, Inc. v. Shal, L.L. C,206 Minnesota became the second state
court (behind South Dakota) to exclude void contracts from arbitration
since the trio of federal appellate decisions.20 7 It also became the second
such court to ignore these opinions.
The party resisting arbitration in Onvoy claimed that the underlying
contract was void by virtue of an interested-director or ultra vires
transaction.0 s Although the dispute was between two commercial parties,
the court took care to note its sympathies for "critics of the broad federal
policy favoring arbitration" who bemoan the implications for consumer
plaintiffs.2 9 By embracing the principle that courts should decide the
void contract issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court believed that its rule
203 Id. at *5 (Bell, J., concurring).
204 Id. at *6 (Bell, J., concurring).
205 Id. at *13 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
206 Onvoy, Inc. v. Shal, L.L.C., 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003).
207 The court began its opinion by noting that the FAA applied to the dispute and
that federal law governed, notwithstanding the fact that Minnesota state law did not
embrace the severability doctrine. Id. at 351. The divergence between state and federal
law on the severability point may have motivated the court's ultimate decision. In any
event, the contrast highlights the federalism aspect of this question.
20s Id. at 353 54.
209 Id. at 352 n.6. One of the concurring justices elaborated on this point in detail,
writing separately "to highlight my concerns regarding the potential for abuse of power
when parties with unequal bargaining power contract to arbitrate their disputes." Id. at
357 (Anderson, J., concurring).
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"leaves room for consumers to escape obvious abuses of power in
contracting.,
210
To reach this result, the court turned to the Second Circuit's decision
in Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Clarendon, the Third Circuit's
decision in Sandvik, and the Ninth Circuit's infamous Three Valleys
decision.211 Interpreting these cases as "carv[ing] out an exception" to
Prima Paint, the court drew a rigid distinction between void and
voidable contracts. 212 While the party seeking arbitration pointed to
Prima Paint, the court did not mention any of the recent federal or state
decisions on point,213 thus making no effort to reconcile its decision with
any contrary authority.
Much like Nature's 10 and Alabama Catalog Sales, Onvoy sounds a
protectionist theme. The court refused to yield to the FAA when what it
considered the core interests of its citizens were at stake. The concurring
opinions only highlight this point as they stress the need to protect
Minnesota consumers (notwithstanding the fact that this was a
commercial dispute) 214 and to protect Minnesota's alternative dispute
system from undue federal encroachment.215 The sharp federal/state
divide, as well as the states' protectionist motifs, illustrate that
commentators are not the only ones attacking Prima Paint based on
federalism concerns.
f Summarizing the State Perspective
The cases highlighted above demonstrate that the states, though
perhaps not unanimously, have generally resisted applying Prima Paint
to void contracts. 216 While these decisions have not been explicit
210 Id. at 352. Interestingly, as support for this proposition, the court cited a
Minnesota statute allowing courts to refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts.
Unconscionability is a doctrine suited to remedying "obvious abuses of power in
contracting" because it generally considers both procedural and substantive aspects of the
contract. Id. The court did not explain how (or whether) unconscionability fails to fulfill
its purpose, as it proceeded to decide the void-contract question.
211 Id. at 353. The court also pointed to Chastain and LS. Joseph. Id. at 354.
212 Id. at 353.
213 Consequently, it is not clear whether the party seeking arbitration neglected to
discover the federal appellate decisions or whether the court intentionally disregarded
them.
214 Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 357-58 (Anderson, J., concurring).
215 Id. at 359 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216 A pair of recent state court cases, however, suggests a possible softening of this
trend. Both the California Supreme Court and a Texas appellate court have followed
federal authority on the void contract question. See Saint Agnes Med. Ctr. v. Pacific Care
of Cal., 82 P.3d 727, 734-35 (Cal. 2003); Dewry v. Wegner, 138 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2004) (following the Fifth Circuit decision in Will-Drill Resources, Inc. v. Samson
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repudiations of the severability doctrine, they have revealed states'
underlying hostility to the concept. This hostility becomes more
pronounced in cases that do not involve the FAA, as some states, freed of
federal preemption concerns, have refused to incorporate severability
principles under state law.217
The most recent state decisions are also conspicuous for their failure
to reconcile their positions with contrary federal appellate court decisions.
The distinction between signatory assent and other void contract
challenges appears to have fallen on deaf ears. In addition, the
protectionist theme that resonates throughout these opinions illustrates
the danger of courts prejudging disputes on the merits and presuming
that arbitrators are not capable of reaching the correct result for
themselves. This is precisely what the severability rule was designed to
avoid.
IV. TOWARDS A MORE COHERENT FRAMEWORK FOR SEVERABILITY
The divisions in the case law led to the following question: is there
hope for a more consistent regime? To address that question, however,
we must first decide whether to retain the embattled severability doctrine.
If Prima Paint survives, then the next question becomes whether the
void/voidable distinction imposes any limitation on the severability
doctrine.
A. Whither Prima Paint?
1. One Recent Attack
In one of the more recent attacks on Prima Paint, Professor Reuben
offers three basic reasons for jettisoning severability: it is unworkable,
circumstances have changed, and repudiation will cause no hardships.2t8
Each of these shall be examined in turn.
Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2003) discussed infra notes 246-50). The Supreme Court
of Connecticut also seemed to reach the same result, although it did not profess to apply
the FAA. See Nussbaum v. Kimberly Timbers, Ltd., 856 A.2d 364 (Conn. 2004).
217 See, e.g., Marks v. Bean, 57 S.W.3d 303, 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) ("The
Minnesota, Tennessee and Louisiana approaches make more sense to us than Prima Paint
and its separability doctrine.") (footnotes omitted), overruled in part by Louisville
Peterbilt, Inc. v. Cox, 132 S.W.3d 850 (Ky. 2004); Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of Am.,
197 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1972), overruled in part by Onvoy, Inc. v. Shal, L.L.C., 669
N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003); Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996) ("But the
separability doctrine has not met with universal favor."); see also Strickland, supra note
146, at 405 ("Some states, however, reject this doctrine of separability.").
218 See Reuben, supra note 47, at 879-81.
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To be sure, confusion exists in the case law regarding Prima Paint,
particularly with respect to the void contract issue. But that alone does
not render severability "unworkable." As explained more fully below, an
appreciation of the scope of the signatory power cases and the
importance of assent leads to a more consistent regime.219 While no
regime (or even a world without severability) would be devoid of
confusion, the framework proposed by this article should make
severability function more smoothly.
Professor Reuben's second criticism is based on a change in
circumstances: by this he means that courts are no longer as hostile to
arbitration as they were when the Supreme Court handed down Prima
Paint in 1.967.22 o Now that the old attitude has changed (and, some would
argue, gone too far the other way), the foundation of Prima Paint has
eroded. The erroneous assumption upon which this argument is built is
that Prima Paint was not designed simply to overcome judicial
reluctance to embrace the FAA. Instead, Prima Paint was a practical
response to a problem that the Court recognized could quickly unravel
the FAA. 2 1 If any party could escape its commitment to arbitrate by
alleging fraud, courts would essentially be compelled to decide
dispositive issues at the outset, and the agreement to arbitrate would not
be worth the paper on which it was written. Therefore, shifting judicial
attitudes do not command overturning Prima Paint.
Reuben's third criticism is that repudiation will cause no hardship.
Detractors from Prima Paint acknowledge that repudiation of the
severability doctrine would render arbitration "slower and costlier," and
would often obligate courts to resolve "issues that will often be
intimately intertwined with the merits that will go to the arbitrator if the
court finds that the parties have formed an enforceable container
contract. ,222 Yet they typically gloss over these concerns without pausing
to appreciate what the practical implications would be. As the Florida
appellate decision illustrated in FastFunding II, these costs would be
substantial. 2 3 The parties in that case litigated for nearly five years,
including two trips to the appellate court, before finally being told that
they had to settle their dispute in the forum to which they initially
agreed-arbitration. Scenarios such as this would be repeatedly played
219 See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
220 See Reuben, supra note 47, at 879-8 1.
221 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 47, at 1390 ("Prima Paint was a breakthrough for
supporters of arbitration in that it prevented parties from avoiding arbitration by asserting
a contract rescission defense based on nonarbitration provisions of the contract.").
222 Ware, supra note 47, at 136. Professor Pittman believes that the rationale behind
Prima Paint was to "reduce the workload in the courts." Pittman, supra note 47, at 861.
223 FastFunding The Co., Inc. v. Betts, 852 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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out in courts across the country if severability fell by the wayside.
Accordingly, the repercussions of repudiation would be palpable.
As a result, these arguments for eliminating severability prove
unsatisfying because they fail to grasp the purpose of Prima Paint or the
reality of repudiation. Because numerous others have also attacked
severability, however, it is appropriate to see if any of their arguments
carry more persuasive force.
2. Did the Supreme Court Get It Wrong?
Another justification for abolishing severability is that the Supreme
Court simply got it wrong when it analyzed the legislative history in
1967. 224 Even if Justice Black had the better of the legal reasoning,225 as
Professors Hayford and Palmiter point out:
There is no use crying over spilt milk. The Court's revisionism,
effectively creating a national policy favoring arbitration, has shown
itself to have legs .... Whatever the statute may have meant originally
and however its drafters may have conceived the legislation's original
jurisdictional reach, it has become today a national charter of private
arbitral freedom.
2 26
The point made by Justice O'Connor in her Southland dissent rings true
here as well: Congress has made no effort to intervene and advise the
Court that it botched the analysis.
Moreover, although there are certainly legitimate counter-arguments,
the FAA does focus attention on the making of the agreement to arbitrate.
Congress could have altered the focus to the making of the underlying
agreement (as some courts have subsequently done), but it did not. From
this perspective, the Supreme Court's decision is defensible. And it is
difficult to deny that Prima Paint played an integral role in solidifying a
national policy in favor of arbitration. In short, an argument that the
Supreme Court made a misstep in 1967 does not support a radical
reshaping of the FAA at this point.
224 Professor Reuben labels this the "statutory analysis" critique. See Reuben, supra
note 47, at 842.
... See, e.g., Harding, supra note 7, at 452 ("The legislative history makes at least
one thing clear: the Court's pronouncement in Prima Paint that it was 'clear beyond
dispute' that Congress was relying on its interstate commerce power when it enacted the
FAA was certainly an overstatement."). But see Drahozal, supra note 37, at 122-60
(defending Southland's interpretation of legislative history).
226 Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 178-79. The "remaking of the statute, far




A host of other challenges have been made to Prima Paint, based on
a variety of theories. These include institutional competence, ethics, and
that severability leaves litigants with few viable challenges to
arbitration.227 Each of these points merits a few words.228
The institutional competence attack posits that judges are better
equipped than arbitrators to decide questions of law regarding contract
formation. Perhaps so, but one could expand this argument and say that
judges are more qualified to interpret federal law regarding antitrust,
RICO, and the panoply of employment antidiscrimination statutes. In
other words, the argument proves too much; if it were accepted, it would
justify repealing the FAA. And the argument also betrays hostility to
arbitration. Why should we presume that arbitrators are incompetent and
incapable, rather than well-trained and fair?22 9
The ethics critique suggests that it is improper to delegate to paid
arbitrators the authority to determine the validity of the underlying
contract if it provides them with jurisdiction.230 This critique, however,
actually supports severability. Recall the arbitration rule from the FAA
quoted earlier in the article, which makes clear that if the arbitrator
determines that the underlying contract is invalid, he or she nevertheless
retains jurisdiction over the dispute. 231 In the absence of severability, a
finding of contractual infirmity would place the arbitrator in an awkward
position that the ethics critique understandably laments. What the
critique misses, however, is that severability resolves this problem.
The reality of endorsing the severability doctrine is that it sharply
curtails the available challenges to arbitration: "[r]are is the case in
227 Reuben, supra note 47, at 842-47; Baker, supra note 47, at 676 ("The next
problem with the Court's reading of the FAA is that complex questions of law are now
left to arbitrators.").
228 Professor Reuben also argues that the Supreme Court's decisions in First Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), and Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
537 U.S. 79 (2002), "raise serious questions about the continued vitality of Prima Paint's
doctrine of separability." Reuben, supra note 47, at 826. Professor Rau, by contrast,
dismisses the notion that Kaplan undercuts Prima Paint. See Rau, supra note 19, at 337
("It should be clear enough by this point that there is not the slightest conflict between
Kaplan and Prima Paint as properly understood."). This article addresses the continuing
vitality of Prima Paint; thus, an in-depth look at subsequent Supreme Court cases that do
not specifically speak to Prima Paint or severability is beyond its scope.
9 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 47, at 1402 ("This view posits that arbitrators
should be presumed to make the correct decision on the question of legality."). Needless
to say, one could probably find both arbitrators and judges to illustrate either perspective.
230 Reuben, supra note 47, at 846-47.
231 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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which a party seeking to avoid arbitration will be able to point to a
deformity of contract formation that is directed exclusively at the
arbitration clause and not at all to the larger container contract., 232 At the
same time, this limitation should not overlook the fact that procedure
under the FAA "is particularly generous in allowing an objecting party
recourse to a court either before, during, or after an arbitration in order to
seek a judicial determination of the scope of consent."' "' And, as
explained below, parties retain the ability to challenge the arbitration
clauses specifically on grounds such as unconscionability, which is far
from a hollow right.
2 34
4. Upholding Prima Paint
In the face of such challenges, severability must stand. Severability
allows for an effectively functioning FAA and honors the intent of the
parties who have agreed to arbitrate. Because this article has repeatedly
emphasized the time and cost savings achieved through severability, it
will not belabor that point. But it is appropriate to say a few words about
the parties' intent.
When two parties execute an agreement with a broad arbitration
clause directing all disputes arising out of, or relating to, the contract to
arbitration, they generally expect (at the outset, at least) to resolve their
differences in arbitration. If the parties prefer to leave certain matters,
such as fraudulent inducement, to judicial resolution, they are certainly
free to do so. Assuming that they have not, however, severability is
consistent with contractual expectations. In the absence of severability,
parties would have no basis for the expectation that they would actually
have to arbitrate their dispute; their lawyer would simply advise them
that they could avoid arbitration if they could conceive of a means to
attack the entire agreement.
Equally important, severability keeps courts from delving into the
merits of the parties' dispute when they have already agreed to
arbitration. If, for example, the court were vested with the power to
determine fraudulent inducement in the underlying agreement and found
no such fraud, it would then direct the parties to arbitration with an
advisory opinion on the merits for the arbitrator. If the arbitrator then
disagreed with the court, the parties might soon find themselves running
in circles. In short, if the parties have agreed to arbitration, then the court
should not rule on the merits of their dispute.
232 Reuben, supra note 47, at 851.
233 Rau, supra note 19, at 352 (internal quotations omitted).
234 See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
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Aside from the structure of the FAA and the parties' intent,
severability is also consistent with international arbitration regimes.235
Although the international view is certainly not dispositive, it does
suggest that the concerns of opponents of Prima Paint may be
exaggerated. One need only glance at rules for international arbitration to
appreciate the acceptance of severability, even as applied to purportedly
void contracts. The International Chamber of Commerce,236 the United
National Commission on International Trade Law,
237 and the AAA 238
have all adopted rules permitting an arbitrator to retain jurisdiction
notwithstanding a finding that the underlying contract was void. Far from
an aberration, severability comports with the practice in other corners of
the globe.
B. Reassessing the "Void" Contract Question
Assuming the continued vitality of Prima Paint, the next question is
how far the severability doctrine reaches. Rather than address this
question in the context of the void/voidable framework, an appreciation
of the distinction drawn by the signatory power cases reveals that courts
and parties are asking the wrong question when they focus on whether
the underlying contract should be classified as void or voidable. The
question should instead be twofold: 1) does the challenge to arbitration
implicate the underlying agreement rather than the arbitration clause
specifically; and 2) if so, can the party resisting arbitration make a
colorable showing that it did not assent to arbitration in the first place.
Becoming bogged down in the sometimes metaphysical debate between
void and voidable contracts only diverts attention from the assent
question. Using a categorical approach to void and voidable contracts is
also problematic because certain subsets of each demand judicial
scrutiny on the threshold issue of assent.
235 For a general discussion of this area, see Note, Arbitration Under Private
International Law: The Doctrines of Separability and Competence de la Competence, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 599 (1994); Monestier, supra note 11, at 232-34.
236 ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 6 ("[T]he Arbitral Tribunal shall not cease to have
jurisdiction by reason of any claim that the contract is null and void or allegation that it is
non-existent provided that the Arbitral Tribunal upholds the validity of the arbitration
agreement.").
237 UNCITRAL Rules, art. 21 ("A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract
is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.").
238 AAA International Arbitration Rules, art. 15 ("A decision by the tribunal that the




This framework naturally leads to the question: why devote such
attention to assent? 239 The answer begins with the Supreme Court and
ends with the language and purpose of the FAA. "Arbitration," as the
Supreme Court famously reminds us, "is a matter of consent not
coercion. ' 240 And as described above, the FAA, like basic contract
doctrine, depends on mutual assent. Moreover, the FAA focuses on the
making of the agreement to arbitrate, which complements due regard for
assent.
Immediately, of course, line drawing problems emerge. One might
argue that if assent is so important, why not focus on any issue
implicating the voluntariness of consent to ensure that parties
(particularly consumers) freely relinquished their right to a judicial
forum?241 The assent window, however, should not be widened to allow
all such challenges to escape arbitration because they pose the risk of
swallowing the rule. Once we proceed down the path of examining the
"quality" of the party's consent, we soon find ourselves walking in the
wrong direction. As explained throughout, the efficacy of the severability
doctrine is realized in directing all disputes about the merits of a
particular matter to arbitration, regardless of the collateral consequences
to contract formation. If the parties have agreed to send all of their
disputes to arbitration (including ones about fraud and the like), courts
should not delay that process. For this reason, assent should not earn the
distinction of being simply the newest theory for wreaking havoc in
arbitration jurisprudence. Rather, it should be limited so that a party
cannot secure a judicial audience simply by claiming that they had no
choice but to sign the contract (because it was boilerplate, etc.).242
Recognition of the importance of assent to arbitration goes a long
way to resolving the confusion that permeates judicial decisions on this
subject and to providing a more consistent framework.243 Acceptance of
239 After all, "[tihe requirement of mutual assent to form a contract may be the most
underappreciated aspect of contract law." Ware, supra note 47, at 113.
24 Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989); see also AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,
648 (1986) ("[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.").
241 For instance, Professor Ware devotes substantial attention to the issue of
voluntary consent in his article. See Ware, supra note 47, at 138-59.
242 As discussed below, such an argument could form the basis for an
unconscionability challenge, which implicates the arbitration agreement specifically, but
not the issue of assent.
243 For example, a circuit split over whether mental incapacity defeats arbitrability
could better be resolved if the courts applied the assent test. See Spahr v. U.S. Bancorp
Inv., Inc., 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that mental capacity is a question for
the court); Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002) (directing
parties to arbitration). The Fifth Circuit applied the overly simplistic view of Prima Paint
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the principles embraced in the signatory power line of cases also defuses
a hypothetical used to call the severability doctrine into question. For
example, some commentators have presumed that strict application of
Prima Paint would compel arbitration in a scenario in which one party
claimed that it signed an arbitration agreement under duress.244 The most
extreme scenario would involve one party pointing a gun at the other
party and forcing the party to sign the agreement. 245 Because the
touchstone of these cases is assent, then a basic application of their
principles would dictate that a court should determine the threshold claim
of assent; in the duress example, it would decide whether the party was
in fact improperly coerced into signing.
246
The duress exception, however, is fairly narrow. Contract law
generally recognizes that questions of duress do not implicate contractual
consent-the party has made a choice, after all. Certain extreme forms of
duress, however, such as the at-gunpoint scenario, "involve the absence
of consent rather than coerced consent., 247 As a result, an employee
could not claim, for example, a failure of assent when his employer
required him to execute an arbitration agreement under penalty of loss of
employment.
2 48
Perhaps a more realistic (and modem) example of assent arises in
some agreements executed via computer. In Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp.,249 the Second Circuit framed a question of
arbitrability regarding a contract executed over the Internet within the
rubric of assent. The plaintiffs in Specht had downloaded free software
from the Internet, and the defendant argued that, by consummating that
250
transaction, they had thus agreed to the software's license agreement.
Unlike typical "clickwrap" transactions, however, the web site at issue
that, because the party challenged the underlying agreement, they must reconvene in
arbitration. Id. at 472-73. Yet the Tenth Circuit's analysis was no more sound; it
concluded that, if the challenge goes both to the entire contract and to the arbitration
agreement, the court must decide the dispute. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1270. The confusion in
both cases could be resolved by evaluating the problem in terms of assent.
244 See, e.g., Ware, supra note 47, at 130.
245 Id. at 134.
246 Professor Rau likewise explains that "[t]here is simply no agreement to anything,
for example, where a signature has been forged, or where an authentic signature was
obtained at gun point." Rau, supra note 19, at 335.
247 PERILLO, supra note 99, § 28.8. But see Lawrence Kalevitch, Contract Will &
Social Practice, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 379, 393-95 (1995) (criticizing the view that duress does
not generally implicate assent).
248 PERILLO, supra note 99, § 28.3.
249 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
250 Id. at 20-21.
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simply invited consumers to download, and the license terms were not
251
available on that web page.
Without so much as mentioning Prima Paint, the court dove directly
into the assent analysis. Applying California law, the court concluded
that a consumer does not manifest assent by clicking on a download
button "if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on
the download button would signify assent" to any sort of license
agreement.25 2 Because the license terms in Specht were buried on other
web pages and it was not apparent from the download page that the
consumer was agreeing to anything, the court had little trouble finding a
lack of assent that defeated arbitrability. At the same time, the extreme
nature of this case suggests a limited application of its scope. The Second
Circuit was quick to distinguish this case from other "clickwrap" or
Internet transaction cases because in the latter examples "there was much
clearer notice . . . that a user's act would manifest assent to contract
terms. '253 Similarly, in the world of paper contracts, courts generally
enforce arbitration clauses contained in documents that are incorporated
by reference into the agreement signed by the party resisting
arbitration.2 54
In one of the most recent attempts to harmonize the divergent
opinions on the void/voidable contract question, the Fifth Circuit
struggled to find a coherent framework in Will Drill Resources, Inc. v.
Samson Resources Co.2 5 ' The case involved a contract for the sale of real
property in which one party maintained that the "agreement" was
actually an offer to purchase the property that was never transformed into
a binding contract. Predictably, the parties exchanged jabs with respect to
Prima Paint, severability, and the void contract question. After sifting
251 Id. at 23-24. The court defined "clickwrap" as an agreement that "presents the
user with a message on his or her computer screen, requiring that the user manifest his or
her assent to the terms of the license agreement by clicking on an icon. The product
cannot be obtained or used unless and until the icon is clicked." Id. at 22 n.4.
252 Id. at 29.
253 Id. at 33-34. The court cited, among others, America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781
So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C, 732 A.2d 528
(N.J. Ct. App. 1999), and Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc., No. C98-20064 JW,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998).
254 See, e.g., Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 97-98 (2d
Cir. 2002); R.J. O'Brien & Assoc., Inc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 260 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A
contract ... need not contain an explicit arbitration clause if it validly incorporates by
reference an arbitration clause in another document."); First Investors Corp. v. Am.
Capital Fin. Servs., Inc., 823 F.2d 307, 309 (9th Cir. 1987); Maxum Founds., Inc. v.
Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It is well settled that, under the Federal
Arbitration Act, an agreement to arbitrate may be validly incorporated into a subcontract
by reference to an arbitration provision in a general contract."). But see Van Wezel Stone,
supra note 41, at 1017-24 (attacking the incorporation by reference rationale).
255 Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Samson Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2003).
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through the mess, as well as the relevant case law on the subjects, the
Fifth Circuit endeavored to articulate a standard applicable to disputes of
this nature. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the severability doctrine:
[R]ests on the assumption that there is an underlying agreement. That
one of the parties later disputes the enforceability of that agreement
does not change the fact that at some point in time, the parties reached
an agreement, and that agreement included the decision to arbitrate
256disputes arising out of that agreement.
Dancing around the void contract question, the Fifth Circuit found
that even if an arbitrator found that the underlying agreement was void,
"the agreement existed long enough to give the arbitrator the power to
decide the dispute." 257 In the end, the court rested its analytical
framework on the existence of the underlying agreement: "[w]e therefore
conclude that where a party attacks the very existence of an agreement,
as opposed to its continued validity or enforcement, the courts must first
resolve that dispute.,
258
While the Fifth Circuit admitted that it drew a "fine distinction"
between existence and enforceability that "will occasionally be
elusive,"' 259 the court ignored the obvious alternative: it could have
simply adopted assent, rather than contractual existence, as its guiding
principle. Perhaps in most cases, the results under either scenario would
be the same. However, focusing on assent, as this article argues,
comports with the structure and purpose of the FAA, as well as basic
contractual principles.
Properly understood, then, the inquiry on void contracts really asks
whether courts or arbitrators should resolve disputes about the
enforceability of the underlying contract because questions of assent will
be decided by the court. This focus on assent, however, certainly will not
satisfy those who maintain that void contracts should never be arbitrated.
Their basic arguments against applying Prima Paint to allegedly void
contracts (aside from the previously discussed detour about "existence")
are that such a rule impermissibly restricts a state's rights to govern
contract law and improperly elevates arbitration clauses above "normal"
contracts.260
256 Id. at 218.
217 Id. at 218 19. Interestingly, the court provides no citation for this proposition.
Again, it illustrates the perils of an undue emphasis on whether the contract is void or
voidable.
218 Id. at 219.
259 [d.
260 See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 11, at 610-13; Baker, supra note 47, at 676.
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1. The Role of State Law
The concerns about erosion of state law and ability to police
contracts are not illegitimate, but misplaced. Applying Prima Paint to
void contracts poses no greater threat to federalism than imposing Prima
Paint in state courts in the first place. The framework and structure of the
FAA are admittedly expansive and leave little room for states to step in
and assert their own contractual policies.26 1 But there are important
exceptions. As Professors Hayford and Palmiter argue, state law still
plays a vital role in "arbitration federalism.,
262
First, section 2 of the FAA instructs courts to turn to state law when
the party resisting arbitration levels a challenge at the making of the
agreement to arbitrate. 63 Perhaps the challenge that has proved most
effective in this regard is attacks on an arbitration agreement based on
unconscionability. 264 Numerous courts, federal and state alike, have
refused to enforce arbitration agreements based on a finding of
unconscionability. Courts have made the unconscionability finding on a
number of grounds, including fees charged for arbitration, 265 un-
reasonable time limitations periods,266 and retention unilateral rights to
modify the arbitration agreement.267 The doctrine of unconscionability
261 See, e.g., Harding, supra note 7, at 425 ("The Court's broad interpretation of the
FAA has challenged the role of the states in regulating a specific kind of contract,
arbitration agreements, a field traditionally handled by the states."); Hirshman, supra note
29, at 1336 ("Thus, under a broad construction of Prima Paint, the FAA itself should
effectively shut off almost all application of state law to cases under the statute.");
Stempel, supra note 47, at 1392 ("The net effect of Prima Paint is to restrict the activities
of courts in policing arbitration agreements for consent and fairness.").
262 See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29.
263 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000):
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving interstate commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
264 See, e.g., Hirshman, supra note 29, at 1337 (noting that state law challenges such
as unconscionability "present[] a viable limit on the scope of the federal arbitration
scheme"); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001 (1996).
265 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
811 (2003).
266 See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003).
267 See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
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accordingly has emerged as an important check on the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.
Second, Professors Hayford and Palmiter propose a notion of
"arbitration federalism" that recognizes the ability of state law to fill in
the gaps left open by the FAA. Divining three "spheres of preemption,"
they argue that, in the first sphere, state law is displaced in the
preemptive core of essential matters addressed by the FAA.26 8 The
second sphere involves the preemptive boundary of "non-essential
matters addressed by the FAA., 26 9 Because the FAA did not intend to
"occupy the field" on these matters, states have a role to play as long as
they generally promote, rather than hinder, arbitration. 270 The final
2711
sphere considers matters that are not addressed by the FAA. Within
this sphere, the validity of state law is presumed, though it should be
consistent "with the twin purposes of the FAA: namely, to overcome
hostility to arbitration and to effectuate the parties' arbitration
agreement. 272
Third, and this is perhaps to state the obvious, state law helps
determine whether the parties assented to the contract in the first place.
As a result, if a party challenges the contract based on forgery, lack of
agent authority, certain types of duress or other similar means, state law
resolves the dispute.273
Finally, arbitrators are constrained by state law in rendering their
awards. To be sure, the grounds for vacating an award under the FAA are
extremely limited.274 However, courts will not enforce arbitration awards
that are made in manifest disregard of the law.275 Manifest disregard of
268 See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 193-94; see also id. at 195
(recognizing "a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt a field traditionally
occupied by state law") (internal quotations omitted).
69 Id. at 195-96.
210 Id. at 195-200.
271 Id. at 200 ("The FAA's coverage is incomplete.").
272 Id. at 201 ("So long as a state does not seek to introduce revocation standards or
limits on an arbitration agreement not applicable to other contracts, state arbitration rules
meant to give content to the parties' arbitral intentions further the FAA's pro-arbitration
policies."). In their article, Professors Hayford and Palmiter survey the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act.
273 See, e.g., Fazio v. Lehman Bros., 340 F.3d 386, 394 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Ordinary
state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts will apply to this analysis.")
(internal quotations omitted); Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 177 (recognizing that
the FAA treats "the question of contract revocation, on generally applicable grounds such
as fraud, duress, and unconscionability, as one of state law-leaving no federal role").
274 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2000). For a more thorough discussion of this area, see
Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial
Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731 (1996).
275 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421
(6th Cir. 1995) ("When faced with questions of law, an arbitration panel does not act in
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the legal standard accordingly answers an extreme hypothetical; applying
Prima Paint to contracts claimed to be illegal would force parties in, say,
a murder-for-hire contract, to go to arbitration. While such a dispute
would be directed to arbitration, presumably no arbitrator would enforce
the underlying contract, but even if he or she did, a court would not
enforce the arbitrator's award because it would be in manifest disregard
of the law.276
Therefore, state law can and should play an important role in
ensuring that arbitration agreements are not unconscionable, providing
background rules where the FAA is silent, determining whether assent to
the agreement took place, and guiding the arbitrator's decision. While
this role may not be as prominent as states would prefer, 277 it
nevertheless strikes an appropriate balance between the need for
uniformity required by the FAA and the states' desire to police
contractual relationships.
2. Elevating Arbitration Provisions Above "Normal" Contracts?
The claim that sending a "void" contract to arbitration elevates the
arbitration provision above normal contracts confirms a fundamental
misunderstanding of the severability doctrine. Despite the fact that "the
contract may well be void and rife with fraud .... these facts do not void
the arbitration clause, which must be analyzed independently." 278
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the impact of severability is to
imagine an arbitration clause in a void contract and then to imagine that
same clause being lifted from that agreement and inserted in a contract
between two parties for the sale of an apple. If the arbitration provision
in the latter agreement is enforceable, it should likewise be enforceable
in the former. Therefore, invoking an arbitration provision in a void
manifest disregard of the law unless (1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined
and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal
principle.").
276 See, e.g., Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 240 F.3d 795, 796 (9th Cir.
2001) ("TRI's assertions that the arbitration award was invalid because it was based on
an illegal contract are properly resolved in the context of TRI's motion to vacate the
award."); Stempel, supra note 47, at 1402 ("In addition, an egregious arbitrator error
concerning contract illegality can be viewed by the court as a 'manifest disregard of the
law."'). Litigation on alleged "illegal" contracts is often more contentious than the
obvious examples of a murder-for-hire or drug-selling contract.
277 See, e.g., Hirshman, supra note 29, at 1336 ("[U]nder a broad construction of
Prima Paint, the FAA itself should effectively shut off almost all application of state law
to cases under the statute."). As explained above, this statement is somewhat of an
exaggeration.
8 Fazio, 340 F.3d at 394.
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contract does not "elevate" it above other contractual provisions-
severability simply mandates that it is scrutinized independently of the
contract in which it is contained.
In the end, those who assail the fiction of severability are prone to
overlook the fiction inherent in "void" contracts. That is to say, if the
party seeking to avoid arbitration freely entered the contract upon its own
accord, then the post hoc effort to invalidate the contract cannot wipe it
from existence. Only through legal presumptions can we arrive at such a
result.
V. CONCLUSION
Although severability may very well be a doctrine born of
convenience, it quickly established itself as an indispensable component
of arbitration law under the FAA regime. Prima Paint therefore ushered
in the modem era of arbitration with its twin holdings: acceptance of
severability and recognition that the FAA was based on Congress's
commerce power. The latter aspect of the decision paved the way for
enforcement of the FAA in state courts and concomitant preemption
consequences.
Now that the state-court step has been taken, should we, as several
commentators have urged, retreat from Prima Paint out of concern for
federalism? After all, a federalism revolution has unfolded in other
comers of the law, such as the federal government's interstate commerce
powers. Severability, however, ensures that courts avoid deciding the
merits of the underlying dispute, prevents trivialization of the FAA by
sending disputes to the forum to which the parties have agreed, and
honors the parties' choice. Chipping away at the severability doctrine
does not honor parties' intent; rather, it provides parties with an impetus
to seek creative ways to avoid arbitration. Many contractual disputes
involve one party claiming that the underlying contract is in some way
invalid. Transferring all such cases to the judicial arena would jeopardize
the FAA, for every crevice in the severability doctrine would certainly be
exploited.279 For these reasons, the attacks on Prima Paint ultimately fall
flat.
Yet the more nuanced void contract question persists. As explained
throughout this article, reliance on the artificial distinction between void
and voidable contracts has resulted in a patchwork of decisions left
floundering without a compass. The Fifth Circuit's proposal, narrowing
279 See, e.g., Monestier, supra note 11, at 239 (suggesting that a distinction between
void and voidable contracts for purposes of severability "promotes manipulation of
pleadings and abuse of process").
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attention to a distinction between contractual existence and continuing
enforcement, fares little better. Rather than encourage strategic shifts in
litigation tactics, this article proposes a framework for addressing the
void contract question that is faithful to the structure and purpose of the
FAA. Settling the focus on the question of assent will return the inquiry
to the threshold of the agreement to arbitrate, where the FAA directs us.
Applying Prima Paint to void contracts thus does not represent a radical
expansion of severability-indeed, Justice Black essentially forewarned
of this possibility in his dissent.
There remains, though, the question of what to do with state law. To
be sure, the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the FAA has
swept it aside in many respects. However, that certainly does not mean
that state law plays an inconsequential role in the modem application of
the severability doctrine. As explained above, the FAA requires that
courts turn to state law to evaluate specific challenges to the arbitration
clause and leaves open numerous gaps that state law can fill.
Furthermore, state law resolves the critical question of whether the
parties assented to the agreement and places an important check on the
ability of arbitrators to disregard fundamental state policies. While this
role for state law may not be as prominent as some courts and
commentators would prefer, it should not be so readily discounted.
Federalism concerns accordingly should not derail the severability
doctrine. Although the two concepts might seem to make strange
bedfellows, increasingly they are becoming intertwined. The Supreme
Court's definition of the FAA's turf can, and should, survive so long as
we appreciate the role reserved for state law. The severability doctrine
should accordingly retain its place at the "cornerstone" of arbitration
law 280 and should be applied to void and voidable contracts alike, with a
healthy regard for issues of assent.
280 Rau, supra note 19, at 331.
[VOL. 93
